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INTRODUCTION

Monarchs of England, and later of Great Britain, the United Kingdom, the Empire, and of Commonwealth nations, have always been recognized by the people, and taken an oath of governance.' The fundamental
principles of the oath have been to govern according to laws and customs;
to judge with equity, justice and mercy; to maintain the laws of God, and to
maintain the peace. So long as English law has existed, it has been in
symbiotic relationship with the powers given by the oath. This Article argues that the oath of governance is the well-spring of all power necessary
and sufficient to govern; and that therefore, all law depends from it. In this
context, the Article will investigate exactly what this common law is. This
inquiry has become more pertinent with the development of the new theory, growing out of judicial review in the United Kingdom and the exercise
of the judicial power, of "common law constitutionalism."
Through an historical and constitutional analysis, this Article argues
that the understanding of those scholars is fundamentally flawed in concentrating their theoretical analysis on what they perceive to be the supremacy
of the common law as articulated by the courts. It is argued that since all
power to make law is dependant on the oath of governance, no supremacy
can be given to one kind of law over another, and that indeed, "common
law" as constitutionally understood, is not confined to judge-made law.
Nor did the "common law" suddenly emerge fully formed, wise and armed,
in the time of Henry II like Pallas Athene from the brow of Zeus. There
had long been law common to the English from Anglo-Saxon times-the
lack of consideration of the role Anglo-Saxon laws has played in the evolution of the common law can be attributed, it is submitted, to the disjunction
between "legal" history and "constitutional" history, and to a narrow professional mindset when considering the evolution of the law, often misinformed as to the historical and constitutional circumstances within which
it grew. While the debt to very many scholars will be obvious from the
footnotes, particular tribute is paid here to the work of the late Patrick
Wormald.
3. This is true of all persons said to be monarchs except Edward Plantagenet, son of Edward IV,
and Edward of Windsor, son of George V; there is also some doubt as to whether Edward IV took the
oath. If no oath was taken, then at law in my view, they were no monarch. After the English Coronation Oath Act, 1688, 1 Will. & Mary c. 6, (Eng.), and the Act of Settlement, 1701, 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2
(Eng.), statute also required the taking of the oath for a person to be monarch. . For an historical and
constitutional substantiation of this premise, see M.R.L.L. KELLY, KING AND CROWN : AN EXAMINATION OF THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE BRITISH KING, unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, 1998,
Macquarie University Library. For a discussion in the Australian context, see MRLL Kelly, The Queen
of the Commonwealth of Australia, 16(1) AUSTRALASIAN PARLIAMENTARY REVIEW, 150-175 (2001).
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In earlier centuries, legal scholars saw a clear connection between the monarch's oath, and all jurisdiction to make laws,
and to ensure justice, peace, liberty and equity-Bracton,
writing in the thirteen century in The Laws and Customs of
England, immediately after setting out the oath of governance of the king, (Henry III)4 states: To this end is a king
made and chosen, that he do justice to all men.' . . The
king, since he is the vicar of God on earth, must distinguish
ius from injuria, equity from iniquity.6 Let him, therefore,
temper his power by law, which is the bridle of power, that
he may live according to the laws, for the law of mankind
has decreed that his own laws bind the lawgiver, and elsewhere in the same source, it is a saying worthy of the majesty of a ruler that the prince acknowledge himself bound
by the laws.' Nothing is more fitting for a sovereign than to
live by the laws, nor is there any greater sovereignty than to
govern according to law, and he ought properly to yield to
the law what the law has bestowed upon him, for the law
makes him king.'
Elsewhere, he wrote:
Now we must turn to liberties [and see] who can grant liberties,. . . Who then? It is clear that the lord king has all dignities, It is the lord king himself who has ordinary jurisdiction
and power over all who are within his realm.' . . . For todo

justice, judgment and preserve the peace is the crown.1 0
and again:

The king has no equal within his realm, [Subjects cannot be
the equals of the ruler, because he would thereby lose his
4. For samples of the oaths of governance see infra Part VII, Annex.
5. 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 309 (GEORGE E. WOODBINE ed.,
SAMUEL E. THORNE trans., (Harvard College ed. 1977) (1968) [hereinafter BRACTON] ("Ad hoc autem
creatus est rex et electus, ut iustitiam faciat universes"). While the attribution of the work to Bracton is of
considerable antiquity, it now seems that the bulk of the work was written in the 1220s and 1230s by
persons other than Bracton himself. It seems to have been edited and partially updated later in the late
1230s, with various additions being made to it between that time and the 1250s. The last owner of the
original manuscript and the author of the later additions was probably Bracton-from Harvard Law
School Library, http://hlsl5.law.harvard.edulbracton/ (31 August, 2006) .
6. Id. at 2: 305 ("Separare autem debet rex cum sit dei vicarius in terra ius ab iniuria,cequam ab
iniquo").
7. Id. at 2: 305-06.
8. Id. at 2: 306 ("Item nihil tam proprium est imperii quam legibus vivere, et maius imperio est
legibus submittere principatum,et merito debet retribuere legi quod lex tribuit ei, facit enim lex quod ipse
sit rex").
9. Id. at 2: 166 ("Of liberties and who may grant liberties and which belong to the king").
10. Id. at 2: 167 ("Est enim corona facere iustitiam et iudicium, et tenere pacem, et sine quibus
corona consistere").
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rule, since equal can have no authority over equal.] nor a
fortiori a superior, because he would then be subject to
those subjected to him. The king must not be under man
but under God and under the law, because law makes the
king. Let him therefore bestow upon the law what the law
bestows upon him, namely, rule and power; for there is no
rex where will rules rather than lex.11
Blackstone in the eighteenth century noted that the king is "the fountain of justice and general conservator of the peace of the kingdom,"1 2 a
sentiment with which Sir Edward Coke agreed, going so far as to say:
In respect whereof [a quotation from Bracton] one saith,
That Corona est quasi cor ornans, cujus ornamenta sunt misericordiaetjusticia [(the crown) is, as it were, cor ornans (an

ornamenting heart), the ornaments whereof are mercy and
justice]. And therefore a King's Crown is an Hieroglyphick
of the Lawes, where Justice, &c. is administered; . . .
Coronam dicimus legis judicium esse, propterea quod certis
est vinculis complicata, quibus vita nostra veluti religata

coercetur [We call the judgment the crown of the law, because it is tied up with certain bonds whereby our lives are
coerced as if by ties.]. Therefore if you take that which is
signified by the Crown, that is, to do Justice and Judgment,
to maintain the Peace of the Land, &c. to separate right
from wrong, and the good from the ill; . 14
What does this mean? Essentially, all these writers agree that it is law
which makes the king-but it is not the judge-made law which makes a
king: it is the law grown up over centuries of monarch-making. It is the law
of recognition by the people and the law as enunciated in the oath of governance. This oath is, as Bracton recognized, that which gives the monarch
11. Id. at 2: 33 ("PAREM autem non habet rex in regno suo, quia sic amitteretpraceptum, cum
par in parem non habeat imperium. Item nec multo fortius superiorem, neque potentiorem habere debet,
quia sic esset inferior sibi subiectis, et inferiores pares esse non possunt potentioribus. Ipse autem rex
non debet esse sub homine sed sub deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem. Attribuat igiturrex legi, quod
lex attribuit ei, videlicet dominationem et potestatem. Non est enim rex ubi dominatur voluntas et non

lex.") The words emphasised are the ones purportedly quoted by Coke out of context in Prohibitions
del Roy. See infra text accompanying notes 43-49.
12. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, A FACSIMILE OF THE
FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769 *257 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979).
13. SIR EDWARD COKE, Introduction to the Seventh Reports, 7 Co. REP. la, 77 E.R. 377-411,

377 (K.B. 1610) ("in the sixth year of the most High and Most Illustrious JAMES, King of England,
(etc.) the Fountain of all Piety and Justice, and the Life of the Law"); and also to the Fifth Reports of
cases decided under Elizabeth I-'. . Queen Elizabeth, the Fountain of all Justice and the Life of the
Law,' from Frontispiece of 'The Fifth Part of the Reports.'
14. Calvin's Case, 7 Co. REP. at lb (italics in original, boldface added); 1 STEVE SHEPPARD,
THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 193 (Liberty Fund, Indianapolis, Indiana, 2003) (translation of Latin in Calvin's Case in brackets).
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"rule and power" to govern all the people, while simultaneously circumscribing those powers by constraining power to the ends of justice, right,
and peace. This law has been common to monarchs for over a thousand
years; this law has applied in common to all the English peoples, and in a
real sense the oath of governance is, as Coke also realised, both the circumference and representation of all law. This law is in this writer's submission, the real "common law constitutionalism."

II. "COMMON LAW CONSTITUTIONALISM": THE

ISSUES

Much recent scholarship has concentrated upon the enunciation of a
far different theory of "common law constitutionalism," particularly in the
field of administrative law and judicial review." "Common law constitutionalism" can perhaps be best described as a theory whose essence is "the
reconfiguration of public law as a species of constitutional politics centred
on the common law court,"16 whereby "the common law court stands at the
centre of a scheme of constitutional politics that is paramount within the
political community and that the primary mechanism by which such a politics operates is through the process of judicial review."" In such a theory,
"[i]udge made law.. .becomes. . a 'higher-order law to which even parliament is subject';"" and therefore,
the common law must serve as a constitutional framework
and expression of the community's most important values.
It therefore enjoys superiority to legislation in the sense that
a statute must be interpreted consistently with deep-rooted
common law principles . .9
In turn, concern about the potential for displacement of the democratic nature of the political polity by the theory (as has certainly been
15. See, e.g., Sir John Laws, Law and Democracy, 1995 PUB. L. 72; Sir John Laws, The Constitution; Morals and Rights, 1996 PUBLIC LAW 622; T. R. S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL
THEORY OF THE RULE OF LAW, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001); see also, especially in the
context of judicial review, T. R. S. Allan, Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intent: A Reply to
Professor Craig, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 563-583 (2004); Paul Craig, Legislative Intent and Legislative Supremacy: A Reply to Professor Allan, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 585.596 (2004); T. R. S.
Allan, ConstitutionalDialogue and the Justificationof JudicialReview, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 563584 (2003); Paul Craig, The Common Law, Shared Power and Judicial Review, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 237-257 (2004); Paul Craig, Constitutional Foundations, the Rule of Law and Supremacy, 2003
PUBLIC LAw 92-111; T. R. S. Allan, The Constitutional Foundationsof Judicial Review : Conceptual
Conundrum or Interpretative theory? 2002 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 87.
16. Thomas Poole, Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 435-454, 439 (also referencing the development by writers of notions

of "common law constitutionalism").
17. Id. at 447.
18. Id. at 448 (quoting Sir John Laws, in Law and Democracy, supra note 15 at 84 (emphasis
added)).
19. T. R. S. Allan, The Rule of Law as the Rule of Reason: Consent and Constitutionalism,

(1999) 115 L.Q.

REV.

221 at 241-242 (emphasis added).
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envisaged by judges 20 and legal academics 21 alike) has sparked some disagreement between the proponents of "common law constitutionalism," 2 2
particularly those who see democracy and constitutional theory as being
"communitarian" rather than "majoritarian, "23 and outright opposition
from other scholars who champion the doctrine of "the sovereignty of

Parliament." 24

A.

Crooked Cords

That the theory of common law constitutionalism as espoused by its
proponents is inherently political in itself can be exemplified by the Festschrift to Sir William Wade-The Golden Metwand and the Crooked

Cord.25 The editors state that they chose this title based on the observations of Sir Edward Coke. 26 They quoted elliptically what Coke had said:
"A good caveat to Parliamentsto leave all causes to be measured by the

golden and streightmetwand of the law, and not to the incertain and
crooked cord of discretion." 2 7 But Coke there was referring to the discretion vested in judges by an Act of Parliament,2 8 enabling judges to hear and
determine certain offenses without a jury trial, not to the discretion of either members of the Houses nor to that of members of the executive, and
noted that parliament had later repealed this Act.2 9 Indeed, the statute
referred clearly to the "justices of assize" and the "justices of the peace;" 30
the object of Coke's ire was, however, "those time-servers, Empson and
Dudley" 31-Privy Counsellors to Henry VII and prominent members of
Henry's Council Learned in the Law which enforced through an equitable
jurisdiction his fiscal policy, particularly through the enforced payments of
debts.3 2 (Coke's vehement antipathy to the equitable jurisdiction and his
continual conflict with Lord Ellesmere is well known.) However, the clear
20. E.g., Sir John Laws, Wednesbury, in THE GOLDEN METWAND AND THE CROOKED CORD,
HARE,
ESSAYS ON PUBLIc LAW IN HONOUR OF SIR WILLIAM WADE QC, C. 185-201 (FORSYTH AND
eds., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998).

1.

21. E.g.,
671 at 675; see
22. E.g.,
23. E.g.,
24. E.g.,

J. Jowell, Beyond the Rule of Law: Towards ConstitutionalJudicialreview, 2000 PUB. L.
also the work of T. R. S. Allan.
Allan, supra note 15, and Craig, supra note 15.
T. R. S. Allan in GOLDEN METWAND, supra note 20, 15-37.

JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999).
25. FORSYTH AND HARE, GOLDEN METWAND, supra note 20.
26. Editors' Preface to GOLDEN METWAND, supra note 20, at vii.
27. 4 Co. INST., c.1, f. 41 (reproduced in 2 SHEPPARD, supra note 14, at 1143 (words in italics are
omitted in the Preface).
28. 11 Hen. 7, c. 3
29. 1 Hen. 8. c. 6.
30. 4 Co. INsT., c.1, f. 40; see also 2 SHEPPARD, supra note 14, 1142, 3 SHEPPARD, supra note 14,
730; see also 2 Co. INST., c. 29, ff.50-51 (Magna Carta); SHEPPARD, supra note 14., at 860.
31. 4 Co. INST., c. 1, f. 41 ("Qui eorum vestigia insistunt, eorum exitus perhorrescant"[Let those
who follow in their footsteps be affrighted by their end]). Text reproduced in SHEPPARD, supra note 14,

at 1143.
32. For a discussion of the Council Learned in the Law, and the alleged infamous activities of
Empson and Dudley, see, e.g., R Somerville, Henry VII's "Council Learned in the Law", 1939 ENG.
HisT. REv. 427-442.
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implication in the editors' Preface to The Golden Metwand33 is that the
"golden metwand" is that of the judge-made law (not statutes, prerogative
or custom) and that "the crooked cord" is the "unlawful discretion" vested
in the executive 3 4 (not judges)-the justification for drawing this inference
is that, while all tribute should certainly be paid to Sir William Wade's
often ground-breaking work in administrative legal scholarship, in the late
20th and the 21st centuries administrative law has concerned itself not with
the discretion exercised by judges, but with that conferred on the executive
by Parliaments, as indeed the editors themselves suggest by their references to the accretions of discretionary power to the state during and after
World War I."
Coke himself, however, was concerned not with the discretion of members of the executive, but rather with the nature of the judicial discretion.
Earlier in the First Institutes, (to which the Golden Metwand editors also

elliptically refer) 36 analyzing Littleton on jury fact findings in relation to
unwritten conditions imposed upon freehold, after which the jurors may
seek guidance from the judges on the law,3 ' he wrote :
"And prayed the discretion of the Justices." That is to say,

They, (having declared the special matter) pray the discretion of the Justices, which is as much to say, as, That they
would discerne what the Law adjudgeth thereupon, whether
for the Demandant or for the Tenant: for as by the authority
of Littleton, Discretio est discernere per legem, quid sit jus-

tum, [Discretion is to know through law that which is just ]
that is, to discerne by the right line of law, and not by the
crooked cord of private opinion, which the vulgar call Discretion: Si d jure discedas, vagus eris, & erunt omnia omni-

bus incerta:[If you depart from the law, you will go astray,
and all things will be uncertain to everybody] and therefore
Commissions that authorise any to proceed, secundum sanas
discretiones vestras [according to your sane discretions], (as
in the case de Sewers) is as much to say, as, Secundum
Legem & consuetudinem Angliae.[According to the law and
custom of England]."
The editors also assert that in Keighley's Case,39 Coke said that "where
discretion was granted . . .it should be 'limited and bound with the rule of
33. Editors' Preface to GOLDEN METWAND, supra note 20, especially vi-vii.
34. Id. at vii ("[Sir William Wade's] achievement has.. .been to bring the Golden Metwand of the
common law to bear on the Crooked Cord of discretion.")
35. Id. at vi.
36. Id. at vii.
37. Co. Lrrr. § 366, ff. 226a-228 ("Judges ought to judge according to the Law that riseth upon
the fact, for Ex facto jus oritur [the law arises out of the fact]"); 2 SHEPPARD, supra note 14, at 725-6.
38. Id. at § 366 f. 227b ("Of estates Upon Condition"); see also 2 SHEPPARD, supra note 14, at 730
(Sheppard's translation in square brackets).
39. Keighley's Case, (1609) 10 Co. REP. 139a (K.B.).
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reason and law'." 40 Again, however, in that case (where the Commission
of Sewers was involved) what Coke actually said, referring to both judges
and administrators, was:
these words in the said Act [Act 23 Hen. 8, c. 5, empowering the Commissioners "to make and ordain laws. . .or otherwise after your own wisdoms and discretions"] sc.
"according to your wisdoms and discretions" are to be intended and interpreted according to law and justice, for
every Judge or Commissioner ought to have duos sales, viz.
salem sapientie, ne sit insipipidus& salem conscientie, ne sit

diabolus:4 1 Also discretion, as it is well described, is scireper
legem quid sit justum [to discern/seeing through law that
which is just]4 2
Moreover, the choice of the title draws heavily upon, and is surely
influenced by, the fictitious case known as Prohibitions del Roy43 where
Coke is reported as saying:
but his Majesty was not learned in the Lawes of his Realm
of England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his Subjects; they are not to
be decided by naturall reason but by the artificiall reason
and judgment of Law, which Law is an act which requires
long study and experience, before that a man can attain to
the cognizance of it; And that the Law was the Golden
metwand and measure to try the Causes of the Subjects; and
which protected his Majesty in safety and peace: With which
the King was greatly offended, and said, that then he should
be under the Law, which was Treason to affirm, as he said;
To which I said, that Bracton saith, Quod Rex non debet esse
sub homine, sed sub Deo et Lege (The king must not be

under man but under God and under the law)."
40. Editors' Preface to Golden Metwand, supra note 20 (citing 10 Co. REP. 139a [author can find
no reference of the kind they refer to at f. 139a or elsewhere in the case]).
41. Keighley's Case, 10 Co. REP. at 139a ("a judge ought to have two salts [guides/maxims/
leaven], the salt [guide/maxim/leaven]of wisdom, lest he be insipid; and the salt [guide/maxim/leaven] of
conscience lest he be devilish.' [Judex habere debet duos sales, salem sapientiae, ne sit insipidus; et salem
conscientiae, ne sit diabolus.]")

42. Id. at 140a.
43. Prohibitions del Roy, Mich. (1608) 12 Co. REP. ff. 63-65. For corrected date and fictitious
nature of the case, see Roland G. Usher, James I and Sir Edward Coke, 1903 ENG. HIST. REV. 664-765.
44. Prohibitions del Roy, Mich. 12 Co. REP. at f. 65. Bracton of course had said more than this.
See BRACrON, supra note 11, and accompanying text refers; see also BRACTON, supra note 8 (going
immediately on to say "quia lex facit regem" [because law makes the king]). One can only conclude
that Coke's fragments quoted Bracton elliptically quite deliberately. The "law" which makes the king,
is, it is argued, the recognition by the people and the oath of governance (or coronation oath), or, to put
it another way, the common law of the monarchy, and not, as Coke was implying, law solely as made by
judges.
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The Twelfth Reports was an ex post facto production, published posthu-

mously (Coke died in 1634) in 1656, the editor amalgamating, translating
and adumbrating scattered papers in law French by Coke; it seems clear
from contemporary evidence that this was a meeting which had never occurred in the way or when the Twelfth Reports assert that it did, that this
was an amalgamation of disparate fragments of different meetings, that
Coke did not in fact defeat the king in the matter of his prerogative, (it may
not even have arisen), probably did not quote Bracton at all, did not utter
the famous phrase concerning the "golden metwand," but rather "fell flat
on all fower. . .beseeching his Majestie to . . pardon him, if he thought

zeale had gone beyond his dutie and allegiance." 4 5 Dicey thought Coke's
assertions in the purported report were "unhistorical,"4 6 Holdsworth
thought the report was untrue,4 7 and there is little doubt that things certainly did not occur as Coke's fragments might have suggested. To assert,
as have some lawyers, that the "prerogative powers in the administration of
justice [passed] into the hands of Her Majesty's judges"4 8 by virtue of this
opinion is ahistorical, places too naive a credence on Coke's self-serving
fragments, and in the view of this writer is just plain wrong.49
It can be seen then, that it is of critical importance that legal scholars
and judges be very clear about what exactly is "the common law" and what
exactly is its relationship with the Constitution and "constitutionalism,"
and that the history surrounding the common law be rigorously investigated. It would also seem unwise to place uncritical credence in Sir Edward
Coke, or to draw analogies between his seventeenth century observations
and twentieth or twenty-first century situations without rigorous historiographical examination.

45. See Usher, supra note 43, for the details and sources; the reference to Coke falling flat on all
fours is from a letter, Sir Rafe Boswell to Dr Milbourne, Hatfield MS. 125, f. 36, as quoted and cited
by Usher at 669.
46. A. V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION, 18 (Macmillan and Co., London, 3d ed., 1889) (1885).
47. 2 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 430-431 (Methuen & Co,
London, 7th ed. 1966) (1903).
48. S. DE SMITH & R. BRAZIER, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, 141, n. 67 (Penguin Books, London, 7th ed. 1994).
49. See DAVID FELDMAN, ENGLISH PUBLIC LAw, (OUP, Oxford, 2004) (giving examples of this
widely accepted view); HILAIRE BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 118-119
(Routledge-Cavendish, Abingdon, 2006); IAN LOVELAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A CRITICAL INTRODUCrION, 104 (Butterworths, London, 1996); SMITH & BRAZIER, supra note 48, 141, n. 67. See also
Paul Craig, Prerogative,Precedent and Power, in GOLDEN METWAND, supra note 20, 65 at 67-68 (concentrating on prerogative in the context of judicial review.); and see also Ivan Hare, Separation of
Powers and Errorof Law,113-139 at 130, in GOLDEN METWAND, supra note 20. There is therefore also
reason to view The Case of Proclamations, 1611, Mich., 8 Jac 1, 12 Co. REP., f. 74, also published
posthumously in Coke's Twelfth Reports, with considerable scepticism (as indeed lawyers have treated
the Case of Non Obstante, 12 Co. REP., f. 18, which supported the dispensing power-see introductory note to Twelfth Reports, referring to Hargrave in 11 STATE TRIALS 30 and to Sergeant Hill, both
of whom challenged the veracity of the Twelfth Reports, the latter saying that that Obstante was 'not fit
to be allowed;' similar scepticism by Holroyd J in Lewis v Walter, 4 Barn. & Ald., 614 was also referred
to).
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Lawyers and the "Common Law"

The protagonists in the "common law constitutionalism debate" all
conflate judge-made "common law" with "the rule of law"-the judgemade common law is the rule of law. In the nineteenth century, Dicey
specifically equated the "rule of Law" with "the predominance of the legal
spirit,""o and with "the supremacy throughout all our institutions of the
ordinary law of the land"; he said:
This rule of law, which means at bottom the right of the
Courts to punish any illegal act by whomsoever committed,
is of the very essence of English institutions. . . .the

supremacy of the law of the land means in the last resort the
right of the judges to control the executive government.
Our constitution, in short, is a judge-made constitution. ..

This emphasis on the "rule of law" in tandem with, and for practically
all writers as a necessary component of, the "common law" has in some
cases been carried to extremes. For example, Allan, writing on the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, said: "Parliament is sovereign because
judges acknowledge its legal and political supremacy," 5 4 and others have
stated "it is the judges who are sovereign."ss (Surely there is someone to

make a case for the people as being the determining factor?) This might
well seem to smack of hubris; and Craig is surely right when he says that
the "rule of law" is a contested concept.5 6 But the conjunction of "rule of
law" with the "common law" as understood in its restrictive sense by these
writers gives rise to the inference that only the courts can uphold the "rule
of law," that only the courts are the bastions of protection for the individual against "arbitrary power"5 7 (a phrase bandied about by administrative
lawyers, but redolent of the misuse put to that phrase in the context of
Whig historiography on the seventeenth century monarchical governments)58 with the corollary that other repositories of power like the executive or the legislature do not, cannot, or may not uphold the "rule of law,"
See Dicey, supra note 46, at 182.
Id. at 393.
Id. at 393-94 (emphasis added).
Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
T. R. S. ALLAN, LAW, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF BRITISH CONSTITUTIONALISM, 10 (Clarendon Paperbacks, Oxford, 1994) (emphasis added).
55. SIR WILLIAM WADE, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS, 33 (Stevens, London, revised edition 1989) (emphasis added) (quoted in GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 24, at 239).
56. Craig, supra note 15, at 585-86.
57. Cf DICEY, supra note 46, at 176.
58. A left-over bias of the Whig historiography; the 17th century has recently been undergoing a
more stringent reappraisal by scholars like Glenn Burgess. See GLENN BURGESS, THE POLITICS OF THE
ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 1603-1642, (Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Philadelphia, 1993); GLENN BURGESS, ABSOLUTE
MONARCHY AND THE STUART CONSTITUTION, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1996); Glenn Burgess, The "Historical Turn" and the PoliticalCulture of Early Modern England: Towards a Postmodern
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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that they may in fact break it, and may even possibly abuse their power,
slipping into "arbitrary government." The "rule of law" has somehow mysteriously become the sole property of lawyers and judges.
In investigating these issues, two major difficulties arise. The first is the
approach of legal historical scholars to the concept of the "common law."
The second is the adaptation of understandings of the "common law" derived in part from such legal historical scholarship to the concept of "constitutionalism," giving rise to a theory of "common law constitutionalism"
which essentially elevates the position of the judiciary in the United Kingdom and elsewhere as guardians of both legal and moral rights seen to be
implicit in constitutionalism and enforced and upheld by the common law
courts, and equates the "rule of law" with this judicial guardianship. Common to both of these issues is a clear understanding of the "common law"
as judge-made law. This Article argues that this is a misapprehension,

which ignores both the origins of, and the nature of, the common law,
which this Article argues are to be found in the monarchical oath of
governance.
This oath, it is argued, has been the underpinning of the law common
to the English for over 1,200 years. The fundamental misapprehension of
the nature of the common law by legal historians and modern legal constitutionalists is, it is argued, founded upon self-limiting understandings of the
law by legal scholars-firstly, as to its essentially 'professionalist' nature;
secondly, by ignoring the Anglo-Saxon laws and their continuity; and
thirdly, by the persistence of Whig historiography amongst lawyers in
marginalizing the central role of the monarchy in the commonality of the
law and in constitutionalism itself.
III.

THE NATURE OF "THE COMMON LAW"

A.

Sir Matthew Hale

The law is organic, as Sir Matthew Hales" realized:
...
the Nature of Laws themselves in general, which being to
be accommodated to the Conditions, Exigencies and Conveniencies of the People, for or by whom they are appointed,
as those Exigencies and Conveniencies do insensibly grow
upon the People, so many times there grows insensibly a
History? in NEo-HISTORICISM: STUDIES IN RENAISSANCE LITERATURE, HISTORY AND PoLITICS, 29-47
(ROBIN HEADLAM WELLS ET AL. EDS., 2000); see also the Introduction by the editors to that book.
59. SIR MATTHEW HALE, 1 November 1609-25 December 1676, educated Magdalen College Ox-

ford, admitted Lincoln's Inn (1628), barrister 1637, counsel for amongst others, a Ship-Money judge and
Archbishop Laud, Justice of Common Pleas under Oliver Cromwell (1654), sat in Oliver Cromwell's
Lower House (1654) and that of Richard Cromwell (1659) and in the parliament of 1660, Chief Baron
of the Exchequer under Charles 11 (1660) and Chief Justice of King's Bench (1671), resigning in 1676;
author of posthumously published HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (1713), HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN

(1736)

JURISDICTION OF THE LORD'S HOUSE

(1796)

GRAPHICAL DICIONARY OF THE COMMON LAW, (A. W. B.

PREROGATIVA REGIs

(1976).

Bio-

SIMPSON ed., Butterworths, London,

1984); ALAN CROMARTIE, SIR MATTHEw HALE 1609-1676: LAW, RELIGION AND NATURAL PHILOSO-

PHY, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) (1995).
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Variation of Laws, especially in a long tract of Time; and
hence it is, that tho' for the Purpose in some particular Part
of the Common Law of England, we may easily say, That is
the Common Law, as it is now taken, is otherwise than it
was in that particular Part or Point in the Time of Hen. II
when Glanville wrote, . . . But tho' those particular Varia-

tions and Accessions have happened in the Laws, yet they
being only partial and successive, we may with just Reason
say, They are the same English Laws now, that they were
600 Years since in the general ... .as Titius is the same Man
he was 40 Years since, tho' Physitians tell us, that in a Tract
of 7 Years, the Body has scarce any of the same Material
Substance it had before.60
In earlier centuries, scholars investigating the common law tended to
see its origins in the days of the Anglo-Saxon period. While much of the
research and thinking concerning the Anglo-Saxon laws was subverted into
polemic for political purposes in the seventeenth century under the rubrics
of "the ancient constitution" 6 1 or "the antiquity of the House of Commons," 62 (matters not investigated here) nevertheless writers were well
aware of the impact of Anglo-Saxon laws. Hale himself had clearly stated
that the common law consisted not only in the leges non scripte, but also in
"Parliamentary Acts or Constitutions, made in writing by the King, Lords
and Commons. . .made before the Time of Memory;" 63 among which he
included those "as were made before the coming in of King William I, commonly called, The Conqueror,"64 but particularly those collected by William Lambard in the sixteenth century-that is, the laws of "Ine, Alfred,
60. SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, 3940 (Charles M. Gray ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1971).
61. For discussion, see the works of GLENN BURGESS, supra note 58; JANELLE GREENBERG, THE
RADICAL FACE OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: ST EDWARD'S "LAWS" IN EARLY MODERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT, (Cambridge University Press 2001); J. G. A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND
THE FEUDAL LAW, (Cambridge University Press 2d ed. 1987) (1957); J. G. A. POCOCK, The Machiavellian Moment, (Princeton Univ. Press 2d ed. 2003); H. BUTrERFIELD, THE ENGLISHMAN AND His His-

(Cambridge Univ. Press 1944), and H. BUTTERFIELD, THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY,
(G. Bell and Sons 1963) (1931); H. NENNER, BY COLOUR OF LAW, (Univ. of Chicago Press 1977); C.
C. Weston, England: Ancient constitution and common law, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT 1450-1700, 374, 374-411 (J. H. BURNS and MARK GOLDIE eds., (Cambridge Univ. Press
1991).
62. WILLIAM PETYT, THE ANTIENT RIGHT OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ASSERTED, OR A Dis-

TORY,

COURSE PROVING BY RECORDS AND THE BEST HISTORIANS, THAT THE COMMONS OF ENGLAND WERE
EVER AN ESSENTIAL PART OF PARLIAMENT, (1680); SIR ROBERT ATKYNS, THE POWER, JURISDICTION,
AND PRIVILEDGE OF PARLIAMENT; AND THE ANTIQUITY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONs ASSERTED

(1689).

Both Petyt and Atkins were among the judges of whom the Lords sought advice as to the

existence of "the original contract" in early 1689. See C. C. WESTON & J. R. GREENBERG, SUBJECTS
AND SOVEREIGNS: THE GRAND CONTROVERSY OVER LEGAL SOVEREIGNTY IN STUART ENGLAND, 249,
255-256. (Cambridge Univ. Press 1981).
63. HALE, supra note 60, at 2-3 (noting that "time before memory" was set as "the Beginning of

the Reign of King Richard I, or Ex prime coronatione Regie Richardi primi.")
64. HALE, supra note 60at 4 (italics in original).
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Athelstane, Edmond, Edgar, Ethelred, Canutus, and of Edward the
Confessor."65

Hale, himself a judge, saw the common law, in its "proper and usual
Acceptation" as being "that Law by which Proceedings and Determinations in the King's Ordinary Courts of Justice are directed and guided."6 6
Clearly for him, the common law was that which guided the judges, not that
which was made by the judges. He made clear his understanding of the
common law when he stated the "formal constituents" of the common law
being three: usage and custom; Acts of Parliament; and judicial decisions.67
Of the latter he says:
...
Decisions of Courts of Justice, tho' by Vertue of the Law
of this Realm they do bind, as a Law between the Parties
thereto, as to a particular Case in Question till revers'd by
Error or Attaint, yet they do not make a Law properly so
called, (for that only the King and Parliament can do); yet
they have great Weight and Authority in Expounding, Declaring and Publishing, what the Law of this Kingdom is,
especially when such decisions hold a Consonancy and Congruity with Resolutions and Decisions of former Times; and
tho' such Decisions are less than a Law, yet they are a
greater Evidence thereof, than the Opinion of private Persons, as such, whatsoever.6 8
There are four reasons Hale gives for weight to be given to judicial
decisions-people chosen as judges have greater knowledge of the laws
than others; such people "are upon their Oaths to judge according to the
Laws of the Kingdom;" they have the "best Helps to inform their Judgments;" and they do so "Sedere pro Tribunali, and their Judgments are
strengthen'd and upheld by the Laws of this Kingdom, till they are by the
same law revers'd or avoided."6 9 It is clear that, for Hale, judicial decisions
in the ordinary courts were not the sum of the common law. In addition to
7 0 Hale remarks:
customs and statutes, it included the Lex Prerogativa.
65. HALE, supra note 60, at 5 (citing WILLIAM LAMBARD esq., TRACTATUS DE PRISCIs AN.
GLORUM LEGIBUS; this text is known as the ARCHION by WILLIAM LAMBARDE of 1592); see also reference in PATRICK WORMALD, The Making of English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century, 6-7, n.
19 (Blackwell Publishers, 2001) (1990); see also his reference to the original source, ARCHAIONOMIA, at
493; And see the reference to WILLIAM LAMBARDE, ARCHEION, CHARLES H. MCILWAIN and PAUL L

(eds.), (Cambridge Mass., 1957), in WESTON & GREENBERG, SUBJECTS AND SOVEREIGNS, supra
note 62, at 10.
66. HALE, supra note 60, at 25 (italics in original); cf DICEY, supra note 46, at 175, 181, 190
("ordinary courts," "ordinary tribunals" and "ordinary Courts," "the ordinary law of the land administered by the ordinary Law courts," and "thus the constitution is the result of the ordinary law of the
land").
67. HALE, supra note 60, at 68.
68. HALE, supra note 60, at 68.
69. HALE, supra note 60, at 68-69.
70. HALE, supra note 60, at 26.
WARD
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(Chapter III Concerning the Common Law of England)-

The common Municipal Law of this kingdom... is the common Rule for the Administration of common Justice in this
great Kingdom;. . . . . This [common] Law is that which
asserts, maintains, and. . . provides for the Safety of the

King's Royal Person, his Crown and Dignity, and all his just
Rights, Revenues, Powers, Prerogatives and Government,
as the great Foundation (under God) of the Peace, Happiness, Honour and Justice, of this Kingdom; and this Law is
also, that which declares and asserts the Rights and Liberties, and the Properties of the Subject; and is the just,
known, and common Rule of Justice and Right between Man

and Man, within this Kingdom. 72

For Hale, then, the common law is "the common Municipal Law or
rule of justice in this Kingdom"" and "that law which is common to the
generality of all Persons, things and Causes, and has a Superintendency
over those particular Laws which are admitted in relation to particular
Places or Matters." 74
B.

Sir Edward Coke

Sir Edward Coke" typically gave many different interpretations of
"the law", saying variously it consisted in fifteen76 or sometimes three different types of law: in his FirstInstitutes drawing on Littleton he mentioned
71. HALE, supra note 60, at 45.
72. HALE, supra note 60, at 46 (emphasis added).
73. HALE, supra note 60, at 56 (emphasis added).
74. HALE, supra note 60, at 57.
75. SIR EDWARD COKE, 1 February 1552-3 September 1634, educated Trinity College Cambridge, admitted Clifford's Inn (Chancery, 1571) and to the Inner Temple (1572), barrister 1578,
Speaker of the House of Commons (1593), Solicitor-General (1592-94) and Attorney-General (15941603) under Elizabeth I, prosecutor on behalf of the Queen in Star Chamber [e.g., 4 February 1597,
Hawarde, Cases in Camera Stella at 32-33] of the Earl of Essex [1601] and Sir Walter Ralegh [(1603) 2
State Trials, 1] for treason, and Attorney-General under James I (1603-1606), knighted by James I (coronation knighthood, 1603), Chief Justice of Common Pleas (1606) and Chief Justice of King's Bench
(1613-1616) under James I, Privy Counsellor 1617-1622, Lord Commissioner of the Treasury 1620,
elected member for Liskeard in the House of Commons 1620, re-elected 1624, elected again, member
for Norfolk 1626, and again in 1628 as member for Buckinghamshire and Suffolk, but does not sit after
finalization of Petition of Right later in 1628; author of THE REPORTS (Co. REP.), Twelve Volumes,
1600-1659, and THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (Co. Lrrr.= 1 Co. INsT.), (4 Vols.), 16281640-see SHEPPARD, SELECTED WRITINGS ... supra note 14, Vol. 1; and see also A. W. B. SIMPSON,
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 59; see also ALLEN D. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE
ELIZABETHAN AGE, (Stanford University Press 2003); SAMUEL E. THORNE, SIR EDWARD COKE 15521952, Selden Society Lecture, 15 March 1952, Lincoln's Inn, (Bernard Quaritch 1957).
76. Co. Lrrr., ff. 11a-11b, 1.1, c. 1, § 3 ("lex Coronce; Lex & consuetudo Parliamenti;Lex nature;
Lex communis Anglie; Statute Law; Consuetudines; Jus belli, in republica maxime conservanda sunt
jura belli; Ecclesiastical, or Canon law in Courts in certain cases; Civil law in certain cases, not only in
the Courts Ecclesiastical, but in the Courts of the Constable, and Marshall, and of the Admiralty; Lex
Foreste;The Law of Marque or Reprisal; Lex Mercatoria;The Laws and Customs of the Isles of Jersey,
Gernsey, and Man; The Law and priviledge of the Stannery; The Laws of the east, west, and Middle
Marches, which are now abrogated.")
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the "Law Temporal", the "Law Spiritual" and the "Ordinary" (in ecclesiastical cases);" earlier he had said, under the heading "common law":
The Law of England in divided, as hath beene said before,
into three parts, the Common Law, which is the most generall and ancient Law of the Realms; ... ; 2. Statutes or Acts
of Parliament; and 3. Particular Customes . . . I say particu-

lar, for if it be the generall Custome of the Realme, it is part
of the Common Law.
The Common Law hath no controller in any part of it, but
the high Court of Parliament, and if it be not abrogated or
altered by Parliament, The Common Law appeareth in the
Statute of Magna Charta and other ancient Statutes (which
for the most part are affirmations of the Common Law) in
the originall writs, in judiciall Records, and in our bookes of
termes and yeers."
However, Coke would probably have agreed with Hale's tripartite
description of the common law,7 9 and on its including the royal prerogative,so Coke admitting that in times "to prevent dangers, which it will be
too late to prevent afterwards" the king may prohibit them before the offence by the "grand prerogative" of proclamation."' He would also agree
that the common law was founded on the doing of justice and right; speaking of clause 29 of Magna Carta, he said:
11. Justitiam vel rectum [Justice or Right.]

Wee shall not sell deny, or delay Justice and right. Justitiam
vel rectum, neither the end, which is Justice, nor the meane,
whereby we may attaine to the end, and that is the law.
Rectum, right, is taken here for law, in the same sense that
jus, often is so called. 1. Because it is the right line,
77. Co. LITr., L. 3, c. 3, Section 648, f. 344a. Coke's discussion arises from Littleton's words
"Patron according to the Law Temporal, and the Ordinarie according to the law spirituall. . . ." He says
that Law Temporal consists in the common law as evinced in books of law and judicial records, statutes
and customs; Law spiritual consists in ecclesiastical laws "allowed by the lawes of this realme viz., which
are not against the common law (whereof the king's prerogative is the principall part) nor against the
statutes and customs of the realme: . ." "Ordinary" he describes as "Ordinarius,he that hath ordinarie
jurisdiction in causes ecclesiasticall, immediate to the king and his courts of common law, for the better
execution of justice. . . ."
78. Co. Lrrr., L.2, c. 10, Section 170, f. 115b; SHEPPARD, supra note 14, 2:711. C.f. also Co. Lrrr.,
f. 110b as to custom, and f. 344a. Cf The Case of Proclamations 12 Co. REP. at 76 ("The law of
England is divided into three parts: common law, statute law, and custom. .
79. See supra, text accompanying note 67.
80. See supra, text accompanying notes 70-72.
81. The Case of Proclamations,12 Co. REP. at 75. It should be noted that the argument in The
Case of Proclamationsis far from consistent, and is likely to suffer from the same defects as Prohibitions del Roy, discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 43-49. See also Caudrey's case, infra note
83. Note also Darnel's case (The Five Knights' Case), 1627, 3 Car. I, 3 STATE TRIALS, 1, 193 ("prerogative is part of the law. . .").
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whereby Justice distributative is guided, and directed, and
therefore all the Commissions of Oier, and Terminer, of
goale delivery, of the peace &c. have this clause, Facturi
quod ad justitiam pertinet, secundum legem, and consue-

tudinem Angliae, [to do what belongs to justice according to
the law (and) custom of England] that is, to doe Justice and
Right, according to the rule of the law and custome of England; and that which is called common right in 2. Edw. 3. is
called Common law, in 14. Edw. 3. &c. in this sense it is
taken, where it is said, ita quod stet recto in curia, i. legi in

curia.[sothat he stand to right in court, that is, to the law in
court.] The law is called rectum [right] because it discovereth, that which is tort, crooked, or wrong, for as right
signifieth law, so tort, crooked or wrong, signifieth injurie,
and injuria est contra jus [c.f. Injuria est in, seu contra jus]
against right: recta linea est index sui, & obliqui, [a straight

line is a guide to itself and to the crooked] hereby the
crooked cord of that, which is called discretion, appeareth
to be unlawfull, unlesse you take it, as it ought to be, Discretio est discernereper legem, quid sit justum. [Discretion is to

discern by law what is just] 3. It is called Right, because it is
the best birth-right the Subject hath, for thereby his goods,
lands, wife, children, his body, life, honor, and estimation
are protected from injury, and wrong: major haereditasvenit
unicuiq; nostrum d jure, & legibus, quam d parentibus.[a

greater inheritance comes to each of us from the law and
statutes than from our parents (Cicero}].8 2
For Coke, then, it could be said that the "common law" was equivalent
to the "common right" and that both were described by the doing of "justice and right."
However Coke's attitude towards what he considered to be the common law depended on his personal circumstances and position. He supported the prerogative over the any other sort of law when he was Speaker
of Elizabeth's Commons, Solicitor-General and Attorney-General." But
once he left the Attorney-ship to become Chief Justice of Common Pleas,
his view changed-he elevated the common law (that is, as used by the
judges) over the both the prerogative8 4 and over Acts of Parliament." But
82. 2 Co. INST., c, 29, f. 56, reprinted in 2 SHEPPARD, supra note 14, at 872 (emphasis added).
83. Caudrey's case, Of the King's Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, Casus Caudreii,De Jure Regis Ecclesiastico, Hil., 33 Eliz., ROTULo 340, 5 Co. REP., la-41b.
84. Case of Proclamations,1611, supra note 81, at 76 ("the King's proclamation is none of [common law, statute, or custom]" but, Coke there also says "the King hath no prerogative, but that which
the law of the land allows him.") I would argue that the law of the land gave the king extensive prerogative through the oath of governance, and indeed the king's prerogative was specifically mentioned in
the Stuart oath of governance. Note also my reservations about the reliability of this so-called Twelfth
Report, supra in notes 49 and 81.
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after his removal from King's Bench in 1616 and his re-appointment as a
Privy Counsellor in 1617, he sat in Star Chamber and was responsible for
the imposition of enormous fines, often upon personal enemies.8 6 But this
reacquaintance with the prerogative was fleeting, and, unsurprisingly in
such a man, his view changed yet again when he was became a member of
James' House of Commons; 7 as a member of the House of Commons, he
elevated Acts of Parliament over both prerogative and common law as
made by judges-he resiled from the findings of the judges in The Five
Knights' case," leading to the Petition of Right and the development of the
concept of "sovereignty" of Parliament.8 9 For Coke, "[r]eason is the life of
the law, nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason; which is to
be understood of an artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long
studyFalse" 9 0 But for Coke, the role of the common law was a moveable
feast, from which he supped differently depending on which position he
held.
But by the time that great man Maitland wrote at the end of the nineteenth century, lawyers, following Coke's lead when he was a judge, had
seized and appropriated the term "common law" to themselves; this led
Maitland to enunciate his own tripartite definition which, however, held
internal inconsistencies:
* It was the "common law" because it was "common" in
the sense of being "general" and as opposed to "special"
law, (and thus did not include equity); 9 ' it was "common
85. Dr Bonham's case, 1609, Mich., 6 Jac. 1, 8 Co. REP., 107a ("for when an act of parliament is
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will
controul it, and adjudge such act to be void"); see also Bonham v Atkins and Others, Hil., 1610, 7 Jac.
1, 8 Co. REP., 114a, f. 118a.

86. Thomas G. Barnes, Introduction to Coke's "Commentary on Littleton", in LAW, LIBERTY
AND PARLIAMENT : SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, 1, 16 (ALLEN D.
BOYER ed., (Liberty Fund 2004).
87. See supra note 75, for details for Coke's career.
88. The Five Knights' Case (Darnel's case), 1627, 3 Car. I, 3 STATE TRIALS 1.
89. see id. at 81-82 (comparing his career as a judge, and his then current one as a member of the
House of Commons, Coke said, "I have now better guides, Acts of Parliament."); see also COMMONS
DEBATES, 1628, II, 213, Proceedings and Debates, ff. 36v-37.
90. 1 Co. INST., 97 b.
91. Of course equity, or the making of judgments with justice, mercy, and truth, was part of the
restriction on the power to make judgments as set down in the oath of governance; on occasion this had
been made explicit:-see the Anglo-Saxon oath, (text infra at Part VII, Annex, A-B, and discussed infra
in text accompanying notes 97-111 and 171-188), which was taken also by William I, see infra Part V, C
William I and Continuity of the Laws; see also BRACTON, supra note 5, at 304, f.107 for Henry III; and
see the text of an oath of governance examined as amended by Henry VIII, in LEOPOLD G. WICKHAM
LEGG, ENGLISH CORONATION RECORDS, 240 (Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd. 1901) ("And he shall do

in his iudgementes equytee and right justice wt discression and mercye"); cf LITTLE DEVICE for Richard III and Henry VII (on some occasions, the notion of "equity" was rendered thus: "You shall make
to be doon after your strengith and powoyr egall and rightfull justice in all your doomys and judgments
and discretion with mercy and troueth") By 1603, these sentiments were rendered thus for James VI
and I, (and Charles I and II, and James II and VII)-"Will you to your power cause law, justice and
discretion in mercy and truth to be executed in all your judgments?" Today, the idea of justice, equity,
mercy and truth in judgment is rendered thus-"Will you to your power cause Law and Justice, in
Mercy, to be executed in all your judgments?" [Elizabeth II, see infra text in Part VI, Annex, F.]
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to the whole land," and "is to be distinguished from local

customs"

92

* It was unenacted law, as distinguished from statutes and
ordinances93
* It was the law of the temporal courts, as distinguished
from ecclesiasticallaw 94
With the greatest respect to Maitland, this definition is deficient,
grounded not in history but in nineteenth century preoccupations, and
owes much to a profession-oriented approach to the law.
C.

The definition of "common law"

How then can one describe the "common law"? Drawing upon the
evolution of the law in England, and having regard to the thinking of lawyers like Hale and Coke, it seems that the common law can best be described as that law common throughout the kingdom and which is "the
common rule of justice and right between man and man."95 What is significant about this definition is that it does not concentrate on that familiar
rubric, "the rule of law," but rather "the common rule of justice and
right,"96 a formulation which goes far beyond the connotations of the former expression, which has tended to become the property of lawyers.
What is even more significant is that this idea of the common law as
justice and right derives directly from the oath of governance. The AngloSaxon-Norman oath required the monarch to "preserve true peace at all
times," to "forbid rapacity and all iniquities to all degrees," and in "all
judgements [to] enjoin equity and mercy." 97 The fourteenth century oath
required the monarch to grant, confirm, and keep the laws and custom of
his predecessors and particularly those of Edward the Confessor (an addition to the Anglo-Saxon oath probably introduced by Henry III), to keep
the peace, to cause law, justice and discretion, in mercy and truth, to be
executed in all [his] judgements, and to uphold, keep, and defend "the laws
and rightful customs, which the commonalty of this your Kingdom have."
By the time of James VI and I, the oath replicated all the provisions of the
fourteenth century oath, but with changes to the first vow regarding maintenance of the laws and customs; 98 James swore in the affirmative to:
92.

F. W.

MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, A SERIES OF LECTURES

1887-1888, 22 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950) (1908). As to equity, see id.
at 225-226, 466-471; the distinction between Courts was largely erased by the Judicature Acts UK
(1873), c. 66; (1875), c. 77; (1876), c. 59); see T. F. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAw, 211-212 (Little, Brown and Company, 5th ed., 1956).
93. MAITLAND, supra note 92, at 22.
94. MAITLAND, supra note 92, at 22.
95. HALE, supra note 60.
96. Accord HALE, supra note 60; COKE, Caudrey's case, supra note 83.
97. See infra at Part VII, Annex, A-B.
98. See infra at Part VII, Annex, at D.
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grant and keep and by your oath confirm to your people of
England the laws and customs to them granted by the kings
of England your lawful and religious predecessors; and
namely the laws, customs and franchises granted to the
clergy and to the people by the glorious king, St Edward,
your predecessor, according and conformable to the laws of
God and true profession of the gospel established in this
kingdom, and agreeing to the prerogatives of the kings
thereof and to the ancient customs of this realm?"
The addition of references to the laws of God and the true profession
of the gospel had been added after the English reformation; the reference
to the acceptability of laws and custom to the prerogative was probably
added by Henry VIII. The specific reference to "this kingdom" was necessary as the Stuarts were also kings of Scotland, and were required to take a
different oath for that realm.'0 The revolution of 1688-89 saw the oath
changed again: in an oath drafted by the commons,' the monarchs in their
English oath swore to:
* govern the people of the kingdom of England and the
Dominions thereto belonging according to the statutes
in parliament agreed on and the laws and customs of the
same
* cause law and justice in mercy to be executed in all
judgements.
* maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the gospel and the protestant reformed religion established by
law [in England] and preserve unto the bishops and
clergy of this realm [England] and to the churches there
committed to their charge all such rights and priviledges
as by law do or shall appertain unto them or any of
them.
This is substantially the same oath sworn by Elizabeth 11,102 the major
difference being that "United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland" has been substituted for "England," the independent nation states
have been added to the first clause, and the establishment of the "reformed
religion established by law" has been specifically confined to England.
Thus, all power necessary and sufficient to govern has been conferred by
this binding of monarch to people in the oath. In essence, this is the basis
99. JURAMENTUM REGIS JACOBI, 1603, from the Tanner manuscript, in the Bodleian Library
(Tanner MSS. [Bodl.], vol. 94, f. 121, in SELECT STATUTES AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE REIGNS OF ELIZABETH AND JAMES I, 391 (G. W. PROTHERO ed., Clarendon

Press, 4th ed. 1963) (1894).
100. See KELLY, KING AND CRoWN, supra note 3, for a complete discussion of the oaths of
governance.

101. Coronation Oath Act, 1688, 13 W. & M. 3, 2, c. 6, (England).
102. See infra Part VII, Annex, F for text.
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of the common law, which includes statutes, customs, judgements, and also
the laws of God.
Of course, as we shall see, since Alfred the laws of God had been
fundamental to English laws, 103 and at least since CnutlO4 the law had been
common in the sense of being general and common to the whole land"o'
and was applied to rich and poor alikelO6 and to all inhabitants independent
of race or position107 and consisted not just of any judgments or dooms
made by those judging on behalf of the king, but also all edicts and written
laws; 10s and from the time of Alfredl 09 written laws had been collected into
a domboc (book of dooms/judgments, edicts) or code, and judges required
to know both the written and unwritten law.110 The relationship between
103. LAWS OF ALFRED THE GREAT, discussed infra in text accompanying notes 171-182.
104. Cnut, king of England, 1016-1035; king also of Denmark, and Norway.
105. II Cnut (secular laws) Prologue, 161 ("and I will that it [the secular law] be observed over all
England [eall Englaland]") cited in B. THORPE, ANCIENT LAWS AND INSTITUTES OF ENGLAND, (The
Lawbook Exchange 2003) (1840).
106. E.g., II Cnut, c. 1, cited in THORPE, ANCIENT LAWS, supra note 105, at 161 ("That is then the
first that I will: that just [rihte] laws be established, and every unjust law [unlage "unlaw"] be carefully

suppressed, and that every injustice [unrihtel be weeded out and rooted up, with all possible diligence,
from this country. And let God's justice [riht] be exalted; and henceforth let every man, both poor and
rich, be esteemed worthy of the folkright, [folcrihtes] and let just dooms [rihte domas] be doomed to
him").
107. Cnut, 1020-"If any be so bold, clerk or lay, Dane or English, as to go against God's laws and
against my royal authority, or against secular law, and be unwilling to make amends, and to alter according to my bishop's teaching, then I pray Thurcyl my earl, and also command him, that he bend that
unrighteous one to right if he can; if he cannot, then will I with the strength of us both that he destroy
him in the land or drive him out of the land, be he better, be he worse. . ." This has been described as a
writ, or as a "letter proclamation" or Cnut's "first letter to the English," manifested after Cnut's Oxford
code of 1018, but before his Winchester Code. See WORMALD, supra note 65, at Table 3.1, 111, 196, 34648, 319; see the translation in WILLIAM STUaBs, SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF
ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 90-92, 91 (H. W. C. DAVIS, ed., Clarendon Press, 9th ed. 1962)
(1870).
108. Cnut 1020-"and I will that all people, clerk and lay, hold fast Edgar's [king 959-975]
law. . ."-STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS, id. at 91, and see infra note 195 and accompanying text. Also see
1 Edward, (king c.899-925) Preamble: Eadwerd cyning byt Dam gerefum eallum, Dat ge deman swa rihte
domas swa rihtoste cunnon, 7 hit on 66ere dombec stande. Ne wandiaa for nanum bingum folcriht to
geregceanne; 7 Damt gehwile sprwce habbe andagan,hwanne heo gelwst sy, bat ge Donne gereccan' [Edward king, commands all reeves: that you give in judgment such right/just judgment as you know to be
the most right/just, and that are in the domboc [book of law/written law.] Nor shall you for any reason/
thing fail to explain/relate/take account of the folcright; and that at the same time it is your duty to have
a date fixed for every decision in a case.] See F. L. ATrENBOROUGH, THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST
ENGLISH KINGS, 114 (Cambridge University Press, 2000) (1922).
109. Alfred the Great, (king 871-899), date of domboc c. 895, see WORMALD, MAKING OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 65, Table 3.1.
110. LAWS OF ALFRED, Introduction, c. 49, § 9 [Ic Da Elfred cyning bds togadere gegaderode, 7
awritan het monege kara fe ure foregenganheolden. Ba ae me licodon; 7 manege Jara be me ne licodon
ic dwearp mid minra witena geaeahte, 7 on oAre wisan bebead to healdanne. Foraam, ic ne dorste
gebrislacan ,ara minra awuht fela on gewrit settan, forbam me was uncuD, hwat xcem lician wolde, ae
cefter ds weren. Ac aa D e ic gemette awaer oabe on Ines dege, mines mages, oiae on Offan Mercan
cyninges obbe on Ebelbtyhtes, be Trest fulluhte onfeng on Angelcynne, ba De me ryhtoste Duhton, ic Pa
heron gegaderode, 7 Jfa oAre forldt. Ic aa flfred Westseaxna cyning eallum minnum witum, P as
geeowde, 7 hie aa cwedon, bat him Jfet licode eallum to healdanne.]-{I then, Alfred, king, have
gathered together these [dooms] and ordered that many of them which our forefathers upheld which

were pleasing to me be written down, and those which were not pleasing to me I, with the advice of my
witan, rejected and in other wise ordered them to be observed. For I durst not venture to set down in
writing much of my own, for it was unclear to me which of them would please those who should come
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the nature of both dooms, edicts, and laws and the Anglo-Saxon (and subsequent monarchical) oath of governance is too striking to be dismissed.
The continuity of those Anglo-Saxon laws and the basis of the administration of justice and government was secured under William 1.111
IV. "LEGAL" AND "CONSTITUTIONAL" HISTORY
A.

The effect of the "professional"mindset

One of the issues underlying the difficulty associated with concepts of
the "common law" is that there would appear to be a disjunction between
"legal history" and "constitutional history." Many lawyers engaged in legal
history have tended to concentrate upon manifestations of the common
law, or upon the practitioners of the common law, or both. In this sense,
much legal history concerning the common law has concentrated upon the
developments of certain kinds of writs or actions,' 1 2 and has tended to concentrate upon what might be called 'private law,"' particularly with regard
to cases involving property.11 4 For example, Milsom states:
The classical common law, like the Roman, was a system of
private law resting upon an idea of private property: it was
about relationships between legal equals whose rights were
protected by government but were not thought of as dependant upon it."15
In one sense, this may be a result of the distinction made by Professor
Ibbetson between "internal legal history" whose sources are "those thrown
up by the legal process"116 as opposed to "external legal history" which he
after us. But those [dooms] which I met with/knew whether from the days of Ine, my kinsman, or of
Offa King of the Mercians, or of JEbelberht, the first of the English race to receive baptism, which
seemed to me to be most just (ryhtoste), those I have gathered here together and the rejected the
others. I then, Alfred, king of the west-Saxons, have shown these [dooms]/this collection to all my
witan and they all declared that it was pleasing to them all that they should be observed/held. (my
translation)}. See also ASSER, §106, in AssER's LIFE OF KING ALFRED THE GREAT AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY SOURCES, 109-110 (S. KEYNES & M. LAPIDGE, eds. Penguin, London, 1983); See also
WORMALD, supra note 65, at 118-125.

111. He took the Anglo-Saxon oath of governance, and undertook to maintain the laws of his
See 2 THE CHRONICLE OF JOHN OF WORCESTER 607 (R. R. DARLINGTON AND P. MCGURK eds., P. McGURK, trans., Clarendon Press, 1995, 2004 reprint) (discussing 1066 entry). For con-

predecessors.

tinuing the laws of his predecessors, see WORMALD, MAKING OF ENGLISH LAW, supranote 65, Table 3.1
and 398-99 (discussing William I, LONDON CHARTER Of 1066); FACSIMILES OF ENGLISH ROYAL WRITS
To A.D. 1100, PRESENTED TO V. H. GALBRAITH (T. A. M. BISHOP and P. CHAPLAIS, eds., Oxford
Univ. Press, 1957); THE ANGLO-SAXONs 237-39, 244 (JAMES CAMPBELL et al., eds., Penguin Books,

1991) (discussing maintainance of Anglo-Saxon administration).
112.

E.g. S. F. C. MILSOM, STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (Hambledon Press,

1985) (especially Part I, 'On the Medieval Personal Actions.'). See also J. H. BAKER and S. F. C.
MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY : PRIVATE LAW TO 1750 (Butterworths, 1986); D. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS (Oxford Univ. Press, 2001).

113. E.g. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 112.
114. E.g. BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 112, xi.
115. See BAKER & MILSOM, supra note 112.

116. David Ibbetson, What is Legal History a History of? in LAW AND HISTORY, 33-40, 34 (AN.
DREW LEWIS

&

MICHAEL LOBBAN eds. Oxford Univ. Press 2004).
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sees as "the history of law as embedded in its context" whose sources are
not "those thrown up by the legal process; nor commonly is its focus the
law." 17 It has been noted that "many [legal historical] scholars are less
concerned with the purely institutional (and certainly with the constitutional) and more interested in the economic and social components of
law."11 8
In turn, much recent legal history appears to operate upon the basis of
a tendency to think that the common law could not exist (or have existed)
without a professional class of lawyers-Paul Brand has asserted in The
Making of the Common Law,'19 in relation to Glanvill,12 0 ("the first common law treatise"' 2 1 written 1187-89)122 that "[n]o such treatise could have
been written at the beginning of Henry [II's] reign, . . .for the Common
Law itself did not then exist." 123 Here, for example, much recent work
analyzes the relationship of lawyers as a profession with the law and its
shape and content,1 24 particularly the development of a "new" or "third
university" in the inns of court and Chancery.12 5 To some extent this may,
consciously or subconsciously, mirror the understanding of Max Weber,12 6
who in studying the historical and social development of capitalism, devised a number of typologies for legal systems, the ideal of which was one
of "logically formal rationality"127 which in turn gives rise to "legalism" or
"legal domination." But fundamental to Weber's analysis of the rise of "legalism," or a rationally based autonomous rule system, was the rise of a
117. See Ibbetson, supra note 116, at 33.
118. Janet Senderowitz Loengard, Beyond Maitland: The Maturing of a Discipline, 34 J. BRIT.
STUD. 529-536, 530 (1995).

119. PAUL BRAND, THE MAKING OF THE COMMON LAW, (Hambledon Press, 1992).
120.

TRACTATUS DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS REGNI ANOLIE QUI GLANVILLA

THE TREATISE OF THE LAWS

AND

CUSTOMS

OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND,

VOCATUR,

COMMONLY CALLED

GLANVILL, G. D. G. HALL (ed. and trans.), (Nelson, in association with the Selden Society, London,
1968). Rannulf de Glanvill's authorship of the treatise and Maitland's original suggestion that he was
probably not the author, have been discussed and, I believe, disproved by Josiah Cox Russell in Ranulf
de Glanville, SPECULUM, XLV, 68-79 (1970).
121. BRAND, Introduction, in MAKING OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 119, x.
122. HALL, Introduction to GLANVILL, supra note 120, xxxi.
123. BRAND, supra note 119, x.
124. See, e.g., J. H. BAKER, THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW, (Hambledon
Press, London, 1986); J. H. BAKER, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: LAWYERS, BOOKS AND THE LAW,

(Hambledon Press, London, 2000); Paul Brand, The Origins of the English Legal Profession, and Multis Vigiliis Excogitatam et Inventam: Henry II and the Creationof the English Common Law, 1-20 and
77-102 respectively in BRAND, MAKING OF THE COMMON LAW, supra note 119; and see PAUL BRAND,
THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION, (Blackwell, Oxford, 1992). See also MICHAEL LoB-

THE COMMON LAW AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 1760-1850, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991,
2001).
125. Originally for this idea see SIR CHARLES OGILVIE, THE KING'S GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMON LAW 1471-1641, (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958), 19; and see also J. H. Baker, The Third University of England,(1990), in BAKER, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 124, 3-28.
126. C.f. David Trubek's observation in his Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism, 1972
WIs L REv, 720-753, 721. All this paragraph referring to Weber is heavily indebted to Trubek.
127. MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 653-658, as discussed in Trubek, Max Weber..
supra note 126, 729-30 and 735-36. All English quotations from and references to Weber are from G.
ROTH AND R. WrIrICH, (eds.), MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, (3 Vols.), 1968, as referred to
by Trubek.
BAN,
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distinct legal profession, a "status group." Such a professional legal class
was a pre-requisite for the ideal type of legal system-or to put it another
way, a professional legal class was a necessity for the rule or domination of
law. Of course, Weber's typology was based primarily on an understanding
of Continental and German (but not English) history and law, and to him
the English common law system was "a deviant case;"12 8 that capitalism
first emerged in England in such a case was a mystery, (the "England problem").12 9 England's legal system, "while far from the model of logically
formal rationality, was sufficiently calculable to support capitalism since
judges were favorable to capitalists and adhered to precedent.", 30
As a result of the "professional" definition of the common law, the
understanding of the "common law" is seen almost solely through the eyes
of practitioners, and is perceived as judge-made law. This in turn has meant
that the investigation of constitutionalhistory as opposed to legal history as
commonly now practiced has become the province of historians, specialists
in government, and political scientists, and not that of lawyers. 13 ' Great
strides have been made by modern non-legal scholars in the field of constitutional history and in stringent re-examination of legal sources and constitutional historiography, examples 32 include publications by J. G. A.
Pocock,"' the Cambridge Studies in Early Modern British History,
historian Glenn Burgess, 3 4 political scientist Alan Cromartie,"3 and
128. To quote Trubek at 746.
129. WEBER, supra note 127, 814, and see also WEBER 3

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY,

supra note 127,

977.
130. Trubek, supra note 127, 747-48, paraphrasing WEBER at 3 Economy and Society, 1395; see
id., 2: 890-91; see also David d'Avray, Max Weber and Comparative Legal History, in LAW
AND HIsTORY, supra note 116, 189-199, 196.
131. C.f. Loengard. Beyond Maitland.. .,supra note 118, 530, n. 1.
132. These are merely some examples.
133. J. G. A. POCOCK, now Harry C. Black Emeritus Professor of History at John Hopkins
University and author of, amongst many others, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW,
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1957, 2nd edn 1987); THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT,
(Princeton University Press, Princeton 2nd paperback edition 2003), BARBARISM AND RELIGION, in 4
Volumes, latest volume (4), BARBARIANS, SAVAGES AND EMPIRES, (CUP 2005).
134. GLENN BURGESS, Professor of Early Modern History, Hull University, and author of The
Divine Right of Kings Reconsidered, 1992 ENGLISH HISTORICAL REVIEW, October 1992, 836-861; THE
POLITICS OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT, 16031642, (Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Philadelphia, 1993); ABSOLUTE MONARCHY AND THE STUART CONSTITUTION, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1996); The "Historical
Turn" and the Political Culture of Early Modern England: Towards a Post-modern History? in NEOHISTORICISM, ROBIN HEADLAMP WELLS, GLENN BURGESS and ROWLAND WILMER (eds.), (D. S.
also

WEBER,

Brewster, Cambridge, 2000), 29-47, and see also the Introduction by the editors to that book.
.

135.

ALAN CROMARTIE, Reader in Politics, Reading University, author of SIR MATTHEW HALE:

LAW, RELIGION AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY,

(Cambridge University Press 1995, 2003), with

QUENTIN

SKINNER editor of WRITINGS ON COMMON LAW AND HEREDITARY RIGHT (CLARENDON EDITION OF

2005); THE CONSTITUTIONALIST REVOLU1450-1642 (Ideas in Context, Cambridge University
Press, 2006); Harringtonian Virtue: Harrington, Machiavelli, and the Method of the Moment, 41 THE
HISTORICAL JOURNAL (1998), 987-1009; Unwritten law in Hobbesianpolitical thought, 2 BRITISH JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 2000, 161-178; The ConstitutionalistRevolution: The
Transformation of PoliticalCulture in Early Stuart England, 163 PAST AND PRESENT, 1999, 76-120.
THE WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES)

(Oxford

University Press
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government specialist, Vernon Bogdanor.13 6
In addition many scholars have tended to see the work of F. W.
Maitland and Sir Frederick Pollock in their History of English Law"' as
being critical to their understanding of the common law."' To be fair to
Maitland, however, it must be noted that he and Pollock specifically eschewed dealing with "constitutional history" in that work, paying tribute in
particular to the work of Stubbs,1 3 9 so that The History of English Law
does not concern itself overmuch with the public face of the law, something
which Maitland had earlier undertaken in his 1887-1888 lectures at Cambridge, subsequently published in 1908 as his The ConstitutionalHistory of
England.1 4 0 Nor does it concern itself much with Anglo-Saxon law, Pollock
(whose sole contribution was the Anglo-Saxon chapter) stigmatizing Anglo-Saxon law as "archaic."14 1 It was not until the great work of the late
Patrick Wormaldl4 2 that Anglo-Saxon law began to takes its rightful place
in twentieth and twenty-first century scholars' understanding of the development of English law.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF ANGLO-SAXON LAW
With the honourable exception of the late Patrick Wormald,1 43 many
modern historians, legal historians, and lawyers,1 4 4 have assumed or asserted that the common law somehow or other began after the Conquest of
136. VERNON BOGDANOR, Professor of Government at Oxford University, Gresham Professor of
Law, Fellow of the British Academy and Honorary Fellow of the Institute for Advanced Legal Studies;
author of THE NEW BRITISH CONSTITUTION, (forthcoming, Allen Lane, 2009); DEVOLUTION IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM, (OUP, 2nd rev. ed. 2001); with DAVID BUTLER and ROBERT SUMMERS, editor of
THE LAW, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GEOFFREY MARSHALL,

(OUP

USA 1999); THE MONARCHY AND THE CONSTITUTION, (OUP, London, 1996); and many others.
137. SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK and F. W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 2 Vols., (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1895, 2nd edn 1898, 1911).
But see Patrick Wormald's observations as to the attitudes of Maitland and Pollock to Anglo-Saxon law
in WORMALD'S MAKING OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 65, 3-4, 15-20.
138. See most works in JOHN HUDSON, (ed.), THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, CENTENARY Es-

SAYS ON "POLLOCK AND MAITLAND", (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996, 1997).
139. See MAITLAND AND POLLOCK, HISTORY, supra note 137, xxxvi-xxxvii, and 136 n. 1.
140. F. W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, a series of lectures given

in Cambridge from 1887-1888, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1908, 1950).
141. See e.g., MAITLAND AND POLLOCK, HISTORY, supra note 137, Chapter 2, 38 ("So far as we

can say there was any regular judicial system in Anglo-Saxon law, it was of a highly archaic type;" and
"archaic rules of evidence;" and 43, "usual archaic features." And see WORMALD, MAKING OF ENGLISH
LAW, supra note 65, at 3, and 15-16.
142. WORMALD, id.,.
143. WORMALD, MAKING OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 65. CAMPBELL, JOHN and WORMALD,
THE ANGLO-SAXONS, supra note 111; Other scholars who deal with the development of the common
law under the Anglo-Saxons are: LisI OLIVER, THE BEGINNINGS OF ENGLISH LAW, (University of Toronto Press, Buffalo, 2002) and ANN WILLIAMS (a medieval historian), KINGSHIP AND GOVERNMENT IN

PRE-CONOUEST ENGLAND, c. 500-1066, (MacMillan Press, London, 1999).
144. E.g. Paul Hyams, Norms and Legal Argument before 1150, in LAW AND HISTORY, supra note
116,41-61 at 41; S. F. G. MiLsoM, A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, (Columbia University

Press, New York, 2003), 1, 105-6 and passim; JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW, LAW AND SOCIETY IN ENGLAND FROM THE NORMAN CONQUEST TO MAGNA CARTA, (Longman, New York, 1996), xi; J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION To ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY,

(Butterworths, London, 4th edition, 2002), 12; PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW,

supra note 92, 13.
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England by William of Normandy,14 5 and usually dated its emergence to
some time around that of Henry 11,146 because of the rationalization of writ
processes and court structures during his reign. That this occurred then is
unsurprising, given the disjunction caused by the preceding civil war between Stephen and Matilda.147 It should not, however, be therefore deduced that there had previously been no law which was common to the
English.
While even F.W. Maitland appeared to think that there could not be a
"common law" before the Norman Conquest, 4 8 as Wormald noted in The
Making of English Lawl 49 this view resulted from the then deeply embedded preconceptions of Anglo-Saxon law;1 0 Maitland also distrusted his
own ability to grasp Anglo-Saxon,'' while being overly-deferential to the
"Teutonic" continental tradition.'5 2 Maitland himself, however, noted that
"a great deal more may yet be done towards reconstructing the AngloSaxon legal system" while noting that it was not a matter for
"beginners."1 5 3
Certainly, it seems that the views on the common law attributed to
Maitland and Sir Frederick Pollock in their History of English Law had a
lasting influence on scholars. 5 4 G. D. G. Hall asserted that "what is clear
is that it (the common law) is a product of the twelfth century," 55 referring
to Maitland's and Pollock's "masterly survey."1 56 But while Hall refers to
145. C.f., GEOFFREY CHAUCER, servant and courtier to Edward III, Richard II and Henry IV, in

describing the sergeant at arms, wrote: "In ternes hadde he caas and doomes alle/That from the tyme of
kyng William were falle."-see GeneralPrologue (c. 1387-92) to THE CANTERBURY TALES, I(A) 323324, in THE WORKS OF GEOFFREY CHAUCER, (ed.) F. N. ROBINSON, (London: Oxford University

Press, 2nd edition, 1957), 20.
146. King of England, 1154-1189
147. For background, see KEITH J.

STRINGER, THE REIGN OF STEPHEN, KINGSHIP, WARFARE AND
GOVERNMENT IN TWELFTH-CENTURY ENGLAND, (Lancaster Pamphlets, London, 1993); EDMUND
KING, (ed.), THE ANARCHY OF KING STEPHEN's REIGN, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994); and
MARJORIE CHIBNALL, THE EMPRESS MATILDA: QUEEN CONSORT, QUEEN MOTHER AND LADY OF THE

ENGLISH
148.
149.
150.
151.

(Blackwell, Oxford, 1991, 1999).
MAITLAND, supra note 140, at 3.
WORMALD, supra note 143.
WORMALD, supra note 143, at 14.
C. H. S. FIFOOT, (ed.), THE LETTERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, Vol. 1, (Selden

Society, Supplementary Series 1, London, 1965, No. 394 1904); and P. N. R. ZUTSHI, (ed.), THE
LETTERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, Vol. 2, (Selden Society, Supplementary series, 11,

London, 1965, No. 311, 1905) (cited and quoted by Patrick Wormald, Maitland and Anglo-Saxon Law:
Beyond Domesday Book, in HUDSON, (ed.), CENTENARY ESSAYS supra note 151, 1-20 at 5, n. 19.

152. WORMALD, supra note 143, at 15-20; see generally Wormald, supra note 151, especially at 4-5;
see also MAITLAND, supra note 140, at 5.
153. - amongst whom seemingly he included himself -MAITLAND, supra note 140., at 5, and
WORMALD, supra note 143, at 16.
154. MAITLAND, supra note 137; see also most of the contributions in HUDSON, supra note 151, at

5, n. 19.
155. HALL, supra note 120, at xi.
156. HALL, supra note 120, xi, n. 3; see also HUDSON, supra note 144, at 19, 20-21, 22-23; note,

however, that Hudson does not dismiss the relevance of Anglo-Saxon origins of the common law, but
does appear to agree that Henry II's changes, together with Anglo-Saxon inheritances, 'combined to
form the common law' at that time.
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parts of the History which do in fact relate to the twelfth century,'
Maitland does not specifically state anything about "the common law" in
those Chapters, except to say that the results of Henry II's activity "were
regarded, not as the outcomes of ordinances, but as part and parcel of the
traditional common law,"' 8 noting that under his reign "the whole of English law is centralized and unified by the institution of a permanent court
of professional judges. . ."159 It is in fact in the next Chapter that Maitland
speaks at more length of the "common law"-writing of the time of Henry
III in the thirteenth century he states: "The term common law (ius commune, lex communis, commun droit, commune lei) is not as yet frequent in

the mouths of our temporal lawyers. On the other hand, ius commune is a
phrase well known to the canonists."1o
In fact, however, Bracton uses the term ius commune quite often, but
always appears to be using it in the sense of "common right,"'6 ' a phrase
analogous to the Anglo-Saxon folcriht or folk-right,'6 2 and not in the sense
of "common law" as currently understood by lawyers (or by Maitland in
the nineteenth century); moreover, it appears that Bracton saw this "common right," together with the "the laws of the land" (legem terre ) and the
"customs of the realm" as being part of "the law." 6 Thus, while it is true
157. HALL, supra note 155, (referring to the second edition of Maitland and Pollock's HIsTORY,
supra note 137, at 1: 107-110 (from Chapter 4, England under the Norman Kings, primarily referring to
Henry I), and 1: 136-173 (Chapter 6, The Age of Glanvill)).
158. MAITLAND, supra note 137, 136-37.
159. MAITLAND, supra note 137, 138.
160. MAITLAND, supra note 137, at 176 ("Common law" is indexed as appearing in only 3 instances. This Article does not investigate the interrelationship between the laws of England and the
civil law or ius commune-for discussion see R. H. Helmholz, The Learned Laws in "Pollock and
Maitland," in HUDSON, supra note 151, 145-69; R. H. HELMHOLZ, THE ius commune in England : Four
Studies, (Oxford Univ. Press, 2001).
161. BRACrON, supra note 5; (2: 73)-Item poterit condicio impedire descensum ad proprios heredes contra ius commune (A condition may prevent descent to hereditary heirs against common right
{my translation: Thorne's is . . . "right heirs against common right."}); (2: 148)-Item poterit donator ex
speciali conventione contra ius commune condicionem suam meliorem facere in causa donationis... et
sic poterit tenens gratis renuntiarehis qua,pro se introductasunt a lege contra ius commune (A donor by
special agreement, contrary to common right, may improve his position by the cause/purpose of the gift
{Thorne : causa}. . . And thus a tenant may freely renounce, contrary to common right, what was
introduced for his protection by the law.) (3: 79)- Item si impetratumfuerit contra ius commune (Also
if the action has been brought contrary to the common right {my translation : Thorne's is: "Also if it has
been impetrated contrary to the common law. . ."}; (3: 232)-Item iniuste ut si contra ius commune, (or
unjustly according to common right {my translation : Thorne's is: "contrary to common right"}); (4:
84)-quia in casu supra dicto ius commune participum recipit divisionem. (because in the case mentioned above, the common right of the participants admits of division {my translation : Thorne's is
"because there the common right of the parceners admits of division"}. While the attribution of the
work to Bracton is of considerable antiquity, it now seems that the bulk of the work was written in the
1220s and 1230s by persons other than Bracton himself. It seems to have been edited and partially
updated later in the late 1230s, with various additions being made to it between t h at time an d the
1250s. The last owner of the original manuscript and the author of the later additions was probably
Bracton-from Harvard Law School Library, HTrP://HLSL5.LAW.HARVARD.EDU/BRACrON/ (last visited
November 21, 2005).
162. As in the Laws of Cnut (II Cnut, c. 1) and Laws of Edward (I Edward, Preamble), see details
infra in text accompanying notes 189-195.
163. E.g., BRACTON, supra note 5, 2: 373 ("Cum autem utlagaria ipso iure nulla eo quod contra
legem terra et consuetudinem regni promulgata,sive subfuerit causa vera vel presumptiva sive omnino
nulla, secundum quod perpendi poterit ex premissis, talis de iure recipi debet ad gratiam et de iure ad
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that the common right was contrasted with written laws, and with customs
of the realm 1 6 4 endorsed by the king, there is no suggestion that only one
was common throughout the kingdom, nor that the "unwritten law" or the
pronouncements of judges necessarily had some special entitlement to being called "common." This kind of thinking was of a much later date. Indeed, much earlier, Henry I had sworn to eradicate bad customs, setting in
their place ones more just1 65 and to apply the laws of King Edward as had
been changed by William Il 66 -this confirmation and maintenance of earlier just laws (leges, leys), customs (consuetudines, custumus) and freedoms
(libertates, franchises) demonstrates the application of law as common
throughout the kingdom, being derived from concepts of justice and right
as enunciated in the oath of governance.
But the idea of a common law, and of the law subsisting in justice and
right had a much longer genealogy than this. While there are suggestions
which should be taken seriously by scholars that much of the Anglo-Saxon
omnia restitui ac si non esset ab initio utlagatus. [When the outlawry is void ipso lure because promulgated CONTRARY TO THE LAW OF THE LAND AND THE CUSTOM OF THE REALM, he ought to be restored
and as may be drawn from what has been said above, admitted to grace of right to everything de jure, as
though he had never been outlawed.]) (emphasis added).
164. BRACTON, supra note 5, 2: 19-Cum autem fere in omnibus regionibus utatur legibus et iure
scripto, sola Anglia usa est in suis finibus iure non scripto et consuetudine. In ea quidem ex non scripto
ius venit quod usus comprobavit (Though in almost all lands use is made of the legibus and the iure
scripto, England alone uses unwritten law AND CUSTOM. {my emphasis) There law derives from nothing
written but from what usage has approved); 2: 21- Huiusmodi vero leges Anglicane et consuetudines
regum auctoritate iubent quandoque, quandoque vetant, quandoque vindicant et puniunt transgressores.
Que quidem, cum fuerint approbate consensu utentium et sacramento regum confirmatx, mutari non
poterunt nec destrui sine communi consensus ecorum omnium quorum consilio et consensu fuerintpromulgate (And because in truth these English laws and customs, by the authority of kings, sometimes
command, sometimes forbid, sometimes castigate and punish offenders. Since they have been approved by the consent of those who use them and CONFIRMED BY THE OATH OF KINGS, they cannot be
changed without the common consent of all those by whose counsel and consent they were promulgated, they cannot be nullified without their consent.); 2: 22-Consuetudo vero quandoque pro lege
observatur in partibus ubi fuerit more utentium approbata,et vicem legis obtinet. Longxvi enim usus et
consuetudinis non est vilis auctoritas(Custom, in truth, in regions where it is approved by the practice of
those who use it, is sometimes observed as and takes the place of lex. For the authority of custom and
long use is not slight)
165. Henry I's coronation oath "Qui consecrationis suae die, sanctam Dei ecclesiam, quae fratris
sui tempore vendita et ad firmam erat posita, liberam fecit, ac omnies malas consuetudines et injustas
exactiones quibus regnam Angliiae injuste opprimebatur,abstulit,pacem firmam in toto suo regno posuit
et teneri praecepit, legem regis Eadwardiomnibus in commune reddidit, cum illis emendationibus quibus
pater suus illam emendavit" as quoted by Robert S. Hoyt, The Coronation Oath of 1308: the background of "Les Leys et les Custumes, " 11TRADMo, 235, 239 (1955), from FLOR. WIG. (FLORENCE OF
WORCESTER-for reference, see infra note 235) II 46f.; see also Henry I's Coronation Charter 1100-Et
omnes malas consuetudines quibus regnum Angliae injuste opprimebatur inde aufero; quas malas consuetudines ex parte hic pono:. . ."And all the evil customs by which the realm of England was unjustly
oppressed will I take away, which evil customs I partly set down here. . ."-Latin from WILLIAM
STUBBS, SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 117118 (H. W. C. DAVIS ed. Clarendon Press, 9th ed. 1962) (1870) (translation from, SELECT DocuMENTS OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 5 (G. B. ADAMS & H.
Company, 1910)).

M. STEVENS, eds. Macmillan

166. This is a reference to Edward the Confessor, who made no laws, but is intended to refer to
the Anglo-Saxon laws, primarily those of Cnut, and (ust) amendments thereto made by William I. See
C. WARREN HOLLISTER, HENRY 1, 112 (Yale Univ. Press 2001); See WORMALD, supra note 143, at 400401.
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law as we know is heavily indebted to Celtic sources,1 67 this Article will
discuss the evolution of a common law of justice and right only from the
time of the Anglo-Saxons, particularly Alfred the Great and his successors.
A.

Alfred the Great's Laws

In Anglo-Saxon times, judgements or edicts were knows as DoomsKings uttered (in the sense of giving out) their Dooms (from O.E. d6m,
meaning judgement, sentence, ruling, law), often with the advice of their
witan. These Dooms were means by which the society was ordered, and
infractions of the peace penalized. While most Anglo-Saxon laws were not
written down, and matters of proof in a law suit determined very much
upon a person's oath (either to the gods or to God), this does not mean
that the laws were not known, though many of the written laws have been
lost. 168 However, after the advent of Augustine in 597, who converted
/Ethelberht King of Kent and Bretwalda, the Dooms began to be written
down after the Roman fashion: this did not mean that they were in any
sense "Roman" rather than indigenous, but rather that they were actually
written down, as the Romans had written down their edicts. The first
known written Dooms were those of ,Ethelberht, c. 601.169 Anglo-Saxon
laws tended to have a standardized beginning: the king would identify himself, authorize the law himself, adverting to the advice and counsel he had
received before making the laws, advise the purpose of the laws, and then
itemize them. 170
167. Michael Treschow, The Prologue to Alfred's Law Code: Instruction in the Spirit of Mercy, 13
FLORILEGIUM, 79-110 (Univ. of Western Toronto 1994) (referring to Dafydd Jenkins, The Medieval
Welsh Idea of Law, TIuDSCHRIFT VOOR RECHTSGESHIEDENIs 49, at 343-48 (1981)); Robin Chapman
Stacey, Law and Order in the Very Old West: England and Ireland in the Early Middle Ages, in CROSSED
PATHS: METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO THE CELTIC ASPECT OF THE EUROPEAN MIDDLE AGES,
49-54 (M. D. LATHAM ed. Univ. Press of America, 1991); see also Janet L. Nelson, The Earliest
Surviving Royal Ordo: Some Liturgical and Historicalaspects, in AUTHORITY AND POWER, STUDIES ON
MEDIEVAL LAW AND GOVERNMENT PRESENTED TO WALTER ULLMANN ON HIS SEVENTIETH BIRTHDAY, 41(Brian Tierney and Peter Linehan eds.,Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980) (especially note 59 referring to her papers in JOURNAL OF ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY, XVIII 48, n. 4); see also Nelson' s
references to J. Prelog, Sind die Weihesalbungen insularen Ursprungs?, 8 FRCHMITrELALTERLICHE
STUDIEN, 303-56 (1979).

168. The Dooms of Ethelberht, Hlothhere and Eadric survive, but those of Offa are lost. For a
coverage of the Old English Dooms, see ArENBOROUGH, supra note 108; see also THORPE, supra note

105.
169. ATTENBOROUGH, supra note 108.
170. For a typical law, see the Dooms of Ine, King of Wessex c.688-Ic Ine, mid Godes gife,
wesseaxna kyning, mid geaeahte 7 mid lare Cenredes mines feder 7 Heddes mines biscepes 7
Eorcenwoldesmines biscepes, [7] mid eallum minum ealdormonnum 7 atem ieldstan witum minre aeode
7 dac micelre gesomnunge Godes aeowa, was smeagende be &ere hcelo urrasawla 7 be aam stak ole ures
rices, atte ryht cew 7 ryhte cynedomas burh ure folc geftestnode weron, P cette nanig earldormonnane
us underge~eodedraafter Pam were awendende aas ure d6mas.[ I, Ine, by the grace of God king of the
West Saxons, with the advice and instruction of Cenred, my father, of Hedde, my bishop, and of Erconwald, my bishop, and with all my ealdormen [nobles] and the [who are the] chief councillors of my
people [witan of my people/nation], and with great concourse of the servants of God [God's people] as
well, have been taking counsel for the salvation of our souls and the security [stability] of our realm
[rices/kingdom/realm], in order that just law and just decrees[just king's judgements/laws] may be established and ensured [held fast] throughout our nation[people], so that no ealdorman nor subject of ours
[people under my rule] may from henceforth [after this] pervert [turn from/avoid] these our decrees
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The most significant of the written Anglo-Saxon laws was that of Alfred the Great."' Alfred had collected all laws which he considered most
just (ryhtoste) into a dombocl 72 (book of dooms/judgments/edicts/laws) or
Code. 1 73 Notably, however, the Code was introduced by a Prologue consisting in the Ten Commandments and Alfred's translation of parts of Exodus.174 It was on the basis that these biblical commands were law/dooms
that after their enunciation, Alfred went on to state (on the basis of the
biblical example) that he had gathered together such pre-existing laws as
seemed to him just in the Code.175
And even more significantly, Alfred carefully adapted some of the
translations from the Latin to fit current circumstances, more than a few
being directed squarely at judgesLeases monnes word ne rec
Du no bxs to gehieranne, ne
his domas ne gebafa au, ne
nane gewitnesse after him
ne saga 6u. (El. 40)

Do not receive the word of a
liar, or consent to his
judgments, or repeat any of
his testimony.

[laws]. . . [and then sets out specific laws]-from ATTENBOROUGH, supra note 108, 40-45 (words in
brackets my translation).
171. Alfred the Great, king 871-899.
172. WORMALD, supra note 143, Table 3.1 (Date of Alfred's domboc c. 895).
173. LAWS OF ALFRED, Introduction, c. 49, § 9 ("Ic haalfred cyning ds togwdere gegaderode, 7
awritan het monege kara ke ure foregengan heolden. ha he me licodon; 7 manege Jara be me ne licodon
ic dwearp mid minra witena geheahte, 7 on ohre wisan bebead to healdanne. Forham, ic ne dorste
gehrislecan bara minra awuht fela on gewrit settan, forham me was uncua, hwat Jifem lician wolde, he
after ds wceren. Ac Da h e ic gemette awher ohhe on Ines dcege, mines mages, ohhe on Offan Mercan
cyninges ohhe on Efelbyhtes, be cerestfulluhte onfeng on Angelcynne, ba he me ryhtoste huhton, ic ka
heron gegaderode, 7 ba ohre forlit. Ic ha ,Elfred Westseaxna cyning eallum minnum witum, k as
geeowde, 7 hie ha cwedon, bcet him bcet licode eallum to healdanne." [I then, Alfred, king, have gathered together these [dooms] and ordered that many of them which our forefathers upheld which were
pleasing to me be written down, and those which were not pleasing to me I, with the advice of my witan,
rejected and in other wise ordered them to be observed. For I durst not venture to set down in writing
much of my own, for it was unclear to me which of them would please those who should come after us.
But those [dooms] which I met with/knew whether from the days of Ine, my kinsman, or of Offa King
of the Mercians, or of Efielberht, the first of the English race to receive baptism, which seemed to me
to be most just (ryhtoste), those I have gathered here together and the rejected the others. I then,
Alfred, king of the west-Saxons, have shown these [dooms]/this collection to all my witan and they all
declared that it was pleasing to them all that they should be observed/held.]) ( my translation). See also
ASSER, §106, in (eds.), ASSER's LIFE OF KING ALFRED THE GREAT AND OTHER CONTEMPORARY
SOURCES, 109-110 (S. Keynes & M. Lapidge ed. Penguin, 1983); and see WORMALD, supra note 143,
118-25.
174. The prologue also included Christ's statement from the Sermon of the Mount that he had
come not to abolish the law but to fulfil it. Matt. 5:17. Accompanying this brief excerpt is the observation that Christ taught mercy and gentleness. El. 49; a translation of Acts 15, which records the
Church's conciliar decree that freed the Gentile Christians from a full obligation to Mosaic law. This
excerpt too has an accompanying observation, that whoever knows and keeps the law of charity has no
need of a law book to guide his judgments (El. 49.1-El. 49.6); a description of how Christian synods
have decreed that Christian nations may, for the sake of mercy, exact monetary compensation instead
of corporal or capital punishment (El. 49.7-El. 49.8), while recognizing that the synods recognized a
limit to such mercy: that merciful allowance of compensation not be repeated in the case of a second
crime, and no compensation whatsoever in cases of treachery against one's lord. See Treschow, supra
note 167, at 79-110.
175. Refer to translation, supra note 173.
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Ne wend Du De no on bxs
folces unned 7 unryht gewill
on hiora sprece 7 geclysp
ofer Din ryht, 7 Des
unwisestan lare ne him ne
ge~afa. (El. 41)

Do not turn, contrary to
your duty, to the people's illcounsel and unjust desire in
their talk and clamour, and
do not allow them that very
unwise advice.

Dem Du swibe emne. Ne
dem Du oaerne dom fram
welegan, oberne Dam
earman; ne oDerne fam
liofran and oaerne fam
labran ne dem Du. (El. 43)

Judge very fairly. Do not
judge with one judgment for
the rich and another for the
poor, nor one for those you
like and another for those
you dislike.

Ne onfoh au nefre
medsceattum, forbon hie
ablendaD ful oft wisra
monna geboht 7 hiora word
onwenda6. (El. 46)176

Never take bribes, for they
all too often blind the
thought of wise men and
corrupt their word.

Michael Treschow makes a convincing argument through a forensic
analysis of Alfred's translation from the Latin into Anglo-Saxon for a deliberate attempt by Alfred to set directions upon his officials, but particularly his judges, due in part as a warning against evil influence on judicial
decisions, perhaps in response to (according to Asser if he may be believed)"' "Alfred's difficulties with corrupt judges.""'
The gist, both of the Prologue and the purpose of the following laws,
was summed up by the first heading of the "contents'-Be 6on bat mon ne
scyle ofrum deman buton swa he wille, bwt him mon deme. [That a man
ought not judge another except as he would want himself to be judged],
and by the final statement in the Prologue itself: Jwt ge willen, at oare
men eow ne don, ne doa ge aet ofirum monnum [that what you do not
want done to yourselves do not to others.] Treschow suggests that this form
of the Golden Rule, and the whole prologue and the laws in the context of
the prologue, is addressed to judges in particular, because of the use of the
word deman (judge), so that they might understand the spirit in which the
law is to be applied, a spirit of fairness and kindness, even of mercy. He
suggests that this
peculiar interest in instructing judges corresponds to the
careful concern over judicial matters that Asser17 9 described
Alfred as showing-he watched his judges closely, and
would not tolerate injustice or negligence on their part.
176. This text and the translation is that of Treschow, supra note 167, at 100-02. See THORPE,
supra note 105, at 24-25 (Anglo-Saxon text and a translation).
177. For some of the problems relating to Asser, see KEYNES, supra note 173, at Introduction.
178. Treschow, supra note 167, at 101.
179. ASSER, ASSER's LiE OF KING ALFRED, 106 (W. H. STEVENSON ed., Oxford Univ. Press,
1904) (as referred to by Treschow, supra note 167).
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Whenever he found someone judging poorly he would upbraid him severely and thereupon require him either to relinquish office or take up an intense study of wisdom
(sapientia).18 0

And here Treschow quotes Alfred thus:
Nimium admiror vestram insolentiam, eo quod, Dei dono et
meo, sapientium ministerium et gradus usurpastis, sapientiae autem studium et operam neglexistis [I am thoroughly
astounded at your audacity that you would assume, under
God's and my authority, the function and status of wise
men, yet neglect the study and practice of wisdom].
Treschow continues:
This entailed the reading of texts whose authority in wisdom
was established, surely patristic and scriptural texts. For
Asser refers to reading with the phrase litteralia studia,
which would seem to indicate that their deficiency was in
Latin letters, not in the established body of Anglo-Saxon
legal texts. Those who could not read were required to have
others read to them. Such an admonition echoes Alfred's
preface to the Pastoral Care, where he calls for an educational reform based on Latin writings that offer wisdom.
Asser's Life evidently closed before Alfred turned to his
own legal reform, for it makes no mention of the law code.
Yet from what he says of Alfred's intentions we can infer
that this opening document is meant to help those without
Latin. We can consider it a quick course in jurisprudential
wisdom for the magistrates who are to execute the law that
follows. 182
These observations by Treschow are supported by Patrick Wormald's
more recent work, where Wormald's investigations of the Anglo-Saxon
laws concludes that Alfred exercised "appellate jurisdiction over his officials and investigated their decisions even on cases not formally submitted
to him," agreeing that Alfred required his judges to know the law, and to
learn to read. He discusses, for example, a long-running case (The case of
Helmstan and Fonthill)" which involved a very rich man, who on committing a crime had his property of Fonthill confiscated and the subsequent
disputes over ownership of the property, the experimental nature of the
180. Treschow, supra note 167, at 81.
181. Treschow, supra note 167, at n. 2.
182. Treschow, supra note 167, at 81-82.
183. WORMALD, supra note 143, at 144-148; The Case of Helmstan and Fonthill, 900 A.D., LS2326, S1445, (this is my naming of the case).
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script perhaps indicating the judge involved had taken Alfred's advice seriously and was learning to write himself rather than dictating his records.184
In addition, there was no paucity of dooms as made by the judges.
Patrick Wormald states that despite the scarcity of written artefacts of Anglo-Saxon case law, (much of which he believes existed sometimes as
"loose-leaf," and others in books which were subsequently destroyed or
defaced) 18 he has been able to find written records of 179 or 180 law suits
heard,1 86 the earliest of which for which he has documentary evidence being dated 736.87

Clearly at one time, there were considerably more

records of Anglo-Saxon "case law."
Throughout the Anglo-Saxon of the Code are references to that which
is riht (right, straight, just), which in turn must. be adhered to by both
judges and administrators, and that which is unriht (un-right, crooked,
wrong, unjust) which must be eschewed by judges and administrators. This
unriht is that same "crooked" to which Coke referred.18 8
B.

The folcriht, The King's Peace and the Common law

The "common right" to which Bracton adverted1 89 was of ancient lineage; the idea of the "common right" or the folcriht had been explicit in the
Anglo-Saxon laws. Moreover, the folcriht was mandated as a source of law
to be taken into account by the judges, together with the written laws, from
at least the time of Edward the Elder, king c. 899-925.190 The application
of the common right, together with the dooms and edicts, were to applied
in common to everyone-for example, the laws of Cnut"' stated:
That is then the first that I will: that just [rihte] laws be established, and every unjust law [unlage 'unlaw'] be carefully
suppressed, and that every injustice [unrihte] be weeded out
and rooted up, with all possible diligence, from this country.
And let God's justice [riht] be exalted; and henceforth let
every man, both poor and rich, be esteemed worthy of the
184. WORMALD, supra note 143, at 145-6, n. 98.
185. WORMALD, supra note 143, 180-81.
186. WORMALD, supra note 143, 143-44.
187. Wormald's listing LS1, S1429, supra note 143, at 181; see also CARTULARIUM SAXONICUM,
156 (W. de Gray Birch, ed., 1885-99).
188. See text to which accompanying notes 27, 38, and 82 supra refers.
189. See discussion supra under the heading "V. The Importance of Anglo-Saxon Law."
190. 1 Edward, Preamble: Eadwerd cyning byt aam gerefum eallum, aet ge deman swa rihte domas
swa rihtoste cunnon, 7 hit on aare dombec stande. Ne wandiaa for nanum aingum folcriht to geregceanne; 7 Dcet gehwile sprece habbe andagan,hwanne heo gelest sy, j et ge aonne gereccan. [Edward
king, commands all reeves: that you give in judgment such right/just judgments/dooms as you know to
be the most right/just (rihtoste), and that are in the domboc {book of law/written law/book of dooms.1
Nor shall you for any reason/thing fail to explain/relate/take account of the folcright; and that at the
same time it is your duty to have a date fixed for every decision in a case. [my translation drawing on
Attenborough, supra note 108, 114.] See also II Edgar, c. 1, in THORPE, ANCIENT LAws, supra note
105, 112 ("I will that every man be worthy of the folcriht, as well poor as rich and that and that righteous dooms be judged to him.")
191. Cnut, king of England, 1016-1035; king also of Denmark, and Norway.
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folkright, [folcrihtes] and let just dooms [rihte domas] be

doomed to him. 192
In addition, the laws of Cnut were common in the sense of being general and common to the whole land,193 and common in the sense of applying to rich and poor alike 9 4 and to all inhabitants independent of race. 9
Therefore, this law which was "common" consisted not just of any judgments or dooms made by those judging on behalf of the king, but also all
edicts and written laws-this had been so not only under Cnut, but also
under preceding kings of the English. 196
So there is evidence of a uniform system of laws both written and unwritten which included the just laws made by the king, and the folkright,
both of which must be adhered to by judges in order that they do right, riht,
or justice; cases being decided upon the basis of the laws; and the king
demanding that judges judge in accordance with the laws, having regard to
mercy.
This concept of a uniform application of laws in common through the
English realm went hand in hand with the establishment of the King's
Peace. While the establishment of the King's Peace over the English as a
nation can be traced from the time of the first written dooms,' 97 and also
from the laws of Edward the Elder, 1 98 more complete evidence of its application can be found in the Dooms of JEthelstan (c. 925-939). He stated that
his witan has advised him that he had too long suffered the fact that his
peace (ure frik our peace) 199 was not rightly kept. 2 0 0 The king's personal
192. II Cnut, c. 1, (secular laws) in THORPE, supra note 105, at 161 (my extrapolations in
brackets.)
193. II Cnut (secular laws) Prologue ("and I will that it [the secular laws] be observed over all
England [eall Englaland]" from THORPE, supra note 105, at 161.
194. E.g. II Cnut, c. 1, supra note 192.
195. Cnut, 1020-"If any be so bold, clerk or lay, Dane or English, as to go against God's laws and
against my royal authority, or against secular law, and be unwilling to make amends, and to alter according to my bishop's teaching, then I pray Thurcyl my earl, and also command him, that he bend that
unrighteous one to right if he can; if he cannot, then will I with the strength of us both that he destroy
him in the land or drive him out of the land, be he better, be he worse. . ." This has been described as a
writ, or as a "letter proclamation" or Cnut's "first letter to the English," manifested after Cnut's Oxford
Code of 1018, but before his Winchester Code-WORMALD, supra note 143, at Table 3.1, 114, 196, 319,
346-48; see also the translation in STusS, supra note 165, 90, 91; Anglo-Saxon text available in F.
LIEBERMANN, infra note 238, at i, 273.

196. STUBBS, supra note 165, at 90, 91 (Cnut 1020-"and I will that all people, clerk and lay, hold
fast Edgar's [king 959-975] law. . .")
197. The first of the written Dooms of fEthelberht, 601, to keep the peace (frib) against breaches.
1 fEthelberht, c. 1, (Mcethl frip II gylde-breach of the peace [to be compensated] twofold); see ATTENBOROUGH, supra note 108, at 4, 5.

198. See ATrENBOROUGH, supra note 108 at 118, 119) (citing 2 Edward the Elder (c.899-925),
Introduction: [Be frybe-Concerning the peace] Edward and his councillors met at Exeter to consider
how "the peace for which they were responsible could be better kept than it had been" (hu heorafrib
[our peace, or their peace-my translation] "betere beon mehte, bonne hit ter Dam wtes"); see also the
Dooms of Edmund (c. 942-946), 3 Edmund ("This is the decree that King Edmund and his bishops
together with his witan formulated... for the maintenance of peace and the swearing of an oath.")
199. ATrENBOROUGH, supra note 108, at 152, 153 (Literally, "our peace").
200. Prologue to 5 Ethelstan, referring to fEthelstan, in ATENBOROUGH, supra note 108, at 142143, 153, 152.
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guarantee of peace (cyninges hand-grib) had become the king's frik (king's
peace) which was seen as the domestic frif of the nation. The king demanded and secured a universal peace (his people shall fri] all that he will
frik), 2 0 1 and this King's Peace was underwritten by the king's mund or protection.20 2 There was thus a great combined effort by king and people to
put the realm under a standing peace, and every magnate and reeve at
AEthelstan's councils after the initial establishment of the peace took an
oath that "he will hold all that frik that King AEthelstan and his witan set
False"20 3 By the time of AEthelred, 2 " the king and his witan could say:
Let us all furthermore give earnest attention to the improvement of the peace and the improvement of the coinage. The improvement of the peace [shall be] such as is best
for the husbandman (bondan) and worst for the
thief ... .And the repair of boroughs (burhbote) and the repair of bridges (bricbote) shall be earnestly pushed in every
region; and likewise the maintenance of the army and the
fleet, whenever there is need, as may be ordered in our
common necessity.20 5
Corresponding to the establishment of the King's Peace is the extension of the king's wite (penalty/punishment) 206 beyond disobedience to the
ancient trinoda necessitas,2 0 7 to include failure to obey the king's express
dooms, orders or laws. This too, began in the reign of Edward the Elder,

201. 2

Aithelstan, c.

20,

§ 3,

(quoted in J. E. A. JOLLIFFE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF

MEDIEVAL ENGLAND, 116 (Adam and Charles Black, London, 4th edn., 1967).

202. 2 iFthelstan, c. 25, § 2, (referred to in JOLLIFFE, supra note 202).
203. 6 f-thelstan, c. 10, (quoted in JOLLIFFE, supra note 202).
204. f-thelred, king 979-1016.
205. 6 /Ethelred, c. 31, c. 32; these last mentioned three obligations were the trinoda necessitas,
the duty and obligation lying on all freemen and landholders to the king. Note that the trinoda necessitas are linked to necessity for the realm.
206. SWEET'S ANGLO-SAXON PRIMER, 12 (Clarendon Press, 9th ed. 1967) (1882).
207. These were three ancient obligations owed to the king in return for his protection (mund)fyrdwite [army-service], burhbote [duty of repairing strongholds], and bricote [duty of repairing bridges
(and, according to Blackstone, roads-WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765-1769, with an introduction by STANLEY N. KATZ,
{University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1979, in 4 Volumes}, Vol. I, Book 1, Chapter 7, 253 and 346:trinoda necessitas: pontis repario, arcis constructrio, et expeditio contra hostem, sourced to 2 Co. INST.,
31, and to MATTHEW PARIS, and to COWELL'S INTERPRETER, tit. castellorum operatio). Maitland also
suggests that there may have been a fourth ancient obligation (to be subject to a wite, or appropriate
penalty for wrongdoing)-F. W. MAITLAND, DOMESDAY BOOK AND BEYOND, THREE ESSAYS IN THE
EARLY HISTORY OF ENGLAND, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1897, reissued Fontana Library, 1960, 2nd impression, London : Fontana Library, Collins, 1961), 324. See also Laws of Ine, c. 45,
and 6 IEthelred, c. 32.
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where on certain counts a man would have to pay his wite for any disobedience (oferhyrnesse)208 to such orders. These orders included king's Ordinances made by writing and proclamation 209 directing compliance by
judges with the written laws of Alfred and Ine,21 o and also directing them
to have regard to the folcriht or common law. 2 11 They also included laws
made by the king with all his councillors for the peace (Be fryke). 2 12 The
categories of oferhyrnesse were extended by AEthelstan 2 13 (notably to include fines for corrupt judgements) 214 and Cnut.215 This marked the beginning of the king's official responsibility for the enforcement of law and
order. No longer were the folc-moots responsible for the judgements they
secured in accordance with the law, with the king's mund being available
only when those remedies failed or were insufficient. Now the judgements
in the moots were enforced by the king's ban. Thus the king's mund, the
king's wite, the trinoda necessitas, and the king's oferhyrnesse came to form

an homogenous body of law enforcement. In addition, outlawry, once the
ultimate sanction of the folc-moots, came formally into the hands of the
king, investing him with the final sanction of law 21 6-AEthelraed stated that
an outlaw in one district was an outlaw throughout the kingdom. 217
By the time of Cnut, king of the Danes, and king by election and conquest of England and later Norway,2 1 8 the struggle by the king and the
people to create peace and order, was substantially completed. This was
achieved through a mix of leadership, loyalty, and by the authority of mutual and voluntary agreement. There was an agreed national peace, the

208. 1 Edward c. 1, § 1 ("Donne sy he cyninges oferhyrnesse scyldig. . .") in ATrENBOROUGH,
supra note 108, at 114; 2 Edward, 2, in Attenborough, supra note 108, at 118; see also JOLLIFFE, supra
note 201, at 109.
209. Eadweardes geradnesses [Be dome 7 sprece]-Edward's Judgements/Ordinances, by judgement/written judgement and speech/proclamation-see ATrENBOROUGH, supra note 108, at 114, 115.
210. 1 Edward, Preamble ". . .aat ge deman swa rihte domas swa rihtoste cunnon, 7 hit on bare
dombec stande," in ATTENBOROUGH, supra note 108, at 114, 204, n. 4.
211. ATrENBOROUGH, supra note 108, at 114, 115 (citing 1 Edward, Preamble "Ne wandiabfor
nanum aingum folcriht to geregceanne [nor shall you for any cause fail to interpret the public law/
folkright]").
212. ATrENBOROUGH, supra note 108, at 118 ("Concerning the peace"-2 Edward, Preamble.
213. 1 Althelstan , c. 5; 2 kthelstan, c. 20, 5 fEthelstan, c. 1 §2-4, in ATrENBOROUGH, LAWS OF
THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGs, supra note 108, at 124, 136, 152-5; SwuaBS, supra note 165, 74-5. For
commentary, see JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 109-10.
214. 5 thelstan, c. 1 §3, in ATrENBOROUGH, supra note 108, at 154-5.
215. 2 Cnut, c. 29; JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 109-10.
216. 1 Ethelred, 1, at 9A; 1 AEthelrad, 1, at 13 ("outlawry had come to apply not only to heinous
crimes against the law, such as killing within the kin, or betrayal of a lord by his man, but also to many
offences of violence, and theft.") For a discussion of outlawry, consult JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 3-4,
107-8; see also Frederick Pollock, The King's Peace,1885 LAw 0. REV. 37-55, 43 ("The peace-breaker, if
he fled, was reckoned an outlaw;. . .") The only available remedies for an outlaw lay either in the king's
pardon, or in sanctuary under the church laws and liberties-see PLUCKNETr, supra note 92, at 430-31.
217. The condemned man was to be outlaw wiD eal folc-1 ikthelred, 1, 9A (text available in
THORPE, supra note 105, at 120.
218. JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 105; see also PETER HUNTER BLAIR, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND, 100-101 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1966) (1956).
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King's Peace, 2 1 9 and a uniform and intensive legal and administrative system to make the peace effective was in place. 2 2 0 And the king controlled
the enforcement of the laws through his reeves, high-reeves, sheriffs and
ealdormen, and by receipt of the wites (penalties, usually monetary) for
breach of his edicts (king's mund, the king's wite, the trinoda necessitas, and

the king's oferhyrnesse). From the time of Alfred, reeves and ealdormen
were required to know the written law, and to impose it upon the courts or
moots. 2 2 1 Cnut bound both Saxon and Dane by the law of Edgar. 2 2 2 He
styled himself "king of the whole of England,"2 23 seeing his realm as one
nation, based on the uniform applicability of his laws to all peoples within
his jurisdiction, rather than discriminating between areas of territory and
jurisdiction on any racial basis. 224 He divided the territory into four large
areas which were administered by earls,2 25 but ordered his law to be observed over all England.22 6 He warned:
If any be so bold, clerk or lay, Dane or English, as to go
against God's laws and against my royal authority, or
against secular law, and be unwilling to make amends, and
to alter according to my bishop's teaching, then I pray
Thurcyl my earl, and also command him, that he bend that
unrighteous one to right if he can; if he cannot, then will I
with the strength of us both that he destroy him in the land
or drive him out of the land, be he better, be he worse... 2 2 7
219. It should be noted that the idea of the peace dying with the king is implicit in the dooms of
the Anglo-Saxon kings, each of whom establishes his own peace: see dooms of successive kings Edward
the Elder and ,Ethelstan.
220. In the forms of the shire and the hundred; see JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 116, 136-7. The
hundred originated from a "voluntary hundred" or "frik-guild"; under Alfred it became the common
administrative system over the individual smaller schemes such as the Danish trithingsand wapentakes,
the Celtic scirs, and the lathes and rapes. The hundred heard all pleas at first instance, except those of
book-land (land granted by charter or boc (book)). The shire would appear to have developed from
the older concept of boroughs, which in turn had replaced the older great ealdormanries. The king's
officers were reeves (boroughs), high-reeves (certain greater boroughs), and sheriffs (shires, or the
modern counties). All of this discussion is greatly indebted to JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at Chapter 2, ii,
("The Kingdom of Britain.")
221. See discussion supra accompanying notes 171-184; see also JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 112
(citing to ASSER, DE REBus GESTIS, at 106. The doomsmen (of the moot) gave judgement, the reeve
demanded it of them, and executed the judgement made.
222. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 1018D (" Dene and Engle wurdon sammele cet Oxanaforda to eadgares Lage"); see also BLAIR, ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND, supra note 218, at 100-101.
223. JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 105; text for the latter in THORPE, ANCIENrr LAWS, supra note

105, at 153 (Cnut, 1027, Proem." Canutus, rex totius Angliae; 1 Cnut (Ecclesiastical Laws), Proem: Cnut
cyning, ealles Englalande cyning").
224. JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 105 ( quoting Consiliatio Cnuti (1110-1130), Proem., 2 "Rationabili consideratione decrevit, quatinus sicut uno rege, ita et una lege universum Angliae regnum regeretur"); see also the discussion in WORMALD, MAKING OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 143, at Table 3.1,

111, 196, 319, 346-48.
225. BLAIR, supra note 218, at 102 (Wessex (eorl Godwine), Mercia (eorl Leofric), Northumbria
(eorl Siward), East Anglia (eorl Thorkell the Tall)).
226. II Cnut (Secular Laws), Prologue.
227. WORMALD, supra note 143, at Table 3.1, 111, 196, 346-48, 319. See also STuBBs, supra note

165, at 75-76 (reproducing a text of a Charter of Cnut of probably 1020, from which this quotation is
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Cnut stated that he would "make full frip through the power that God
has given me." 22 8 In this he was successful. By the time of Edward the
Confessor, the King's Peace and the laws and their enforcement were entrenched, and he could speak of "all the pleas that belong to my crown. "229
These pleas included not only any rents or taxes owed to him as king (sac
and soc, scot and gafol, feorm, team and toll), but also the financial penal-

ties imposed for any offences against the King's Peace, which by that time
included, in addition to the trinoda necessitas [fyrdwite, bricbote, and
burhbote], faestengewerce, flymenafyrmae, forsteall, fyrdsocne, gryabryce,
hamsocn, infangenefeof, mundbryd, oferhyrnesse, weardwite, and wer-

gild.2 30 These pleas were a coherent jurisdiction appurtenant to the crown,
and separate from the folkright, part of the cynescipe (the special powers of
the king) 2 3 1 or the cyneryhta (rights of the king).
Cnut, like his Anglo-Saxon predecessors, clearly saw the law as being
two-fold-the law was comprised of God's laws,232 and secular laws. The
King's Peace then was not merely a mechanism by which unity was established among disparate peoples in the process of forging a State, but was
also a direct outcome of the responsibility of the king to protect his people,
and to obey and enforce God's laws, as he had sworn to do at his
coronation.
In conclusion then, by 1066 under the Anglo-Saxon kings there was:
-a bond between king and people, by virtue of the people's
involvement in selection and ratification of the king, and
the king's oath of governance 2 3 3
-a continuing commitment by each king through the oath
of governance to maintain the peace and protect his people, outlaw iniquity impartially, and to do justice with equity and mercy.
taken (sourced to York Gospel Book, MS.)); and see JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 105, who sources this
to Cnut, 1020, 9-10.
228. Quoted in JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 116 ( referring to Cnut, 1020, at 3); and see STUBBS

supra note 165,at 75 (Charter of Cnut: "... and I do to you to wit that I will be a kind lord and unfailing
in God's rights and to right secular law. I took to my remembrance the writing and the word that
archbishop Lyfing brought me from Rome from the pope, that I should everywhere maintain the glory
of God and put down wrong, and work full peace by the might that God would give me. . .".
229. Ealle tha gyltas tha belimpeth to mine kinehelme; omes forisfacturae quae pertinent ad regiam
coronam meam: quoted in JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, citing to Charter of Edward the Confessor to
Ramsey, from J. EARLE, LAND CHARTERS, 344. See also Grant by Edward the Confessor to Westminster Abbey, 1056, reproduced in 1 SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HIsTORY: VOL. I: A SELECTION OF DOCUMENTS FROM AD 600 TO THE INTERREGNUM, 31-32 (C. Stephenson & F. G. Marcham,
eds., Harper & Row rev. ed. 1972) (citing THORPE, DIPLOMATARIUM, 368 ff.: "I have granted... free of

scot and gafol, with all things pertaining,. . .sac and soc, toll and team, infangenejeof, blodwite and
weardwite, hamsocn, forsteall, gryabryce and mundbryce, and all the rights which there belong to
me.. . .")
230. For meanings, see Glossary to KELLY, supra note 3, or any Anglo-Saxon Dictionary. .
231. JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 105, 111.
232. See, the Ten Commandments in the Introduction to the Laws of Alfred; Dooms of Edward
and Guthrum, § 1 (In the first place they declared they would love God. . .), ArrENBOROUGH, supra
note 108, at 103.
233. For text and translation of the oaths, see infra Part VII, at Annex A-B.
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-promulgation of laws and judgement of cases in accordance with dooms issued by the king, or made by his
judges in accordance with his instructions in accordance
with his oath, which included application of the folkright
-a system of taxes, and a recognizable regime of identification of ownership of property and land
-a means of rectifying infractions of the kings dooms, or
disputes over the ownership of property or land.
C.

William I and Continuity of the Laws.

After William of Normandy defeated Harold II in 1066, he became
king of the English. But in doing so, he adhered to what had become the
common legal processes in England. He was elected by the witan,2 34 as had
been Edward and Harold before him.23 5 And he swore the same oath as
had his predecessors, promising "to protect the holy churches of God and
their governor, and to rule the whole kingdom subject to him with justice
and kingly providence, to make and maintain just laws, and straitly to forbid every sort of rapine and all unrighteous judgments."2 3 6 Not only was
this a significant step in legitimating William's kingship, as he swore the
same oath that his Saxon predecessors had, but it also established the continuity of the law.23 7 William proceeded to make enactments establishing
his peace,238 and formally enjoining the upholding of the laws of Edward
the Confessor: "This likewise I wish and enjoin: that in [cases affecting]
lands, as in all other matters, all shall keep and hold the law of King Edward, with the addition of those [amendments] which I have made for the
benefit of the English people." 239
234. WILLIAM STUBBS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT, 280 (Clarendon Press 4th ed. 1883) (1875).
235. DARLINGTON & McGURK, supra note 111; see also Florence, a monk of Worcester, compiler
of 1 FLORENTI WIGORNIENSIS MONACHI CHRONICON EX CHRONICIs, 229 (B. THORPE ed., English Historical Society, 1849) (1848) translated in THOMAS FORESTER, THE CHRONICLE OF FLORENCE OF
WORCESTER, 171, (Henry G. Bohn ed. & trans., AMS Press 1968) (1854).
236. McGURK, supra note 111, at 607.
237. See H. G. RICHARDSON, & G. 0. SAYLES, THE GOVERNANCE OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND
FROM THE CONQUEST TO THE MAGNA CARTA, 26-29 (Edinburgh Univ. Press, Edinburgh, 1964) (1963)
("The Normans had little statecraft and little foresight. The Normans had very little to teach even in
the art of war, and they had very much to learn. They were barbarians who were becoming conscious of
their insufficiency. That the Normans had little statecraft and little foresight, that they had very little to
teach and very much to learn, seems to us the obvious conclusion from their history; but so to declare
we recognise, is to fly in the face of settled convictions of successive generations of historians to whom

the Conqueror has appeared as a heroic figure of almost superhuman proportions.") This observation is
endorsed by J. H. BAKER, supra note 144, at 12 ("The Norman invaders were warlike, uncultured and
illiterate.. .they found in England a system of law and government as well developed as anything they
had left in Normandy. Certainly they had no refined body of jurisprudence to bring with them.").
238. William 1, 1 and 3, from the Latin, in F. LIEBERMANN, DIE GESETZE DER ANGELSACHSEN,
Text und Ubersetzung, Unverinderter Neudruck der Ausgabe 1903-1916, (Scientia Aalen, Sindelfingen,
Germany, 1960), 3 Vols., I: 486f., reprinted in STEPHENSON & MARCHAM, supra note 229, at 37.
239. William I, 7; from the Latin, in LIEBERMANN, id., as reproduced in STEPHENSON and
MARCHAM, id. .; and see William I, Charter of London, 1066, quoted in WORMALD, MAKING OF ENGLISH LAW, supra note 65, 398-99: ".. .you shall be worthy of all those laws that yet were in the time of
King Edward;. . ."
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Were William a conqueror, (though many have disputed this) 24 0 legally
he had dominion over all English lands and people; if he were not, then he
took control by virtue of his recognition by the people and his oath of governance. He asserted his lordship over every acre of land in England (the
terra regis),2 4 1 which formed the basis of a very large increase in the revenues of the crown.24 2 While those who had fought against William had
their lands confiscated, he was prepared to allow those who recognized him
as king to redeem their land, which in many ways was akin to the old Anglo-Saxon wite. The Anglo-Saxons were, according to Elizabeth Hallam,
"well accustomed to literate administration using their native tongue, and
to the holding of royal surveys of tax liability, the results of which had been
preserved in the royal treasury at Winchester."2 43 Earlier disputations over
land, "at least since Cnut's reign" had often been settled by reference to
the tax records. 244 There was, then, a pre-existing tax system and records
thereof, prior to the Conquest, as well as an established fiscal administration for control of the coinage and levying tax, which was preserved and
utilized by the Normans.2 4 5 However, Edward the Confessor had imported
numerous Normans to positions of influence, and after the Conquest and
the resumption of much Anglo-Saxon land, and subsequent changes in title
due to rebellions by Saxons and Norman alike, and depredations by Norman earls, by 1085 the ownership of land had become of some importance
for the purposes of levying taxes. Consequently, William organized a great
survey by royal commissioners of the ownership of land, both at the time of
Edward the Confessor, and the present (1085) ownership, which included
improvements, cultivation, tenants, its worth then and now, and whether
additional tax could be levied; the survey was completed by the end of
1086, and became known to history as the Domesday Book, (The Book of
the Day of Judgement).

So far as other laws were concerned, what had become known as the
pleas of the crown under the Confessor broadened under William. They
included not only those offences for which the king and his witan had laid
down a pecuniary penalty payable to the crown in forfeiture for the breach
240. See Hale supra note 60, at 4 (referring to ". . .the coming in of King William I, commonly
called, The Conqueror"). See also CAMPBELL, JOHN and WORMALD, supra note 111.
241. JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 139, and the sources quoted there in note 2.
242. JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 183 (discussing Chapter 3). Note also, that a king by conquest
could at his discretion impose any of his laws upon the conquered, and as fruits of victory could take
any land which he had conquered, which now came under his possession and sovereignty. Moreover, in
the light of this precept, William I's undertaking to maintain the laws of Edward the Confessor is much
more than a merely conciliatory gesture.
243. ELIZABETH M. HALLAM, DOMESDAY BOOK THROUGH NINE CENTURIES, 16 (Public Records
Office, Thames and Hudson by permission of HMSO, London, 1986) (relying on H. R. LYON, THE
GOVERNANCE OF ANGLO-SAXON ENGLAND, 118-22 (1983); J. Campbell, Observationson English Government from the tenth to the twelfth century, 39-54 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIsT. SocIETY, 5th
ser., xxv. 1975); S. P. J. Harvey, Domesday Book and its predecessors, 1971 ENG. HIST. REV. 753-73
Ixxxvi; M CLANCHY, MEMORY TO WRrflEN RECORD, ENGLAND 1066-1307, 11-17 (1979).
244. HALLAM, supra note 243, at 18 (relying on S. P. J. Harvey, Domesday Book and AngloNorman Governance, 175-93 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SOCIETY, 5th ser., xxv (1975).
245. HALLAM, supra note 243, at 19.
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of the King's Peace or the law,24 6 but also what the Normans had known as
"the pleas of the sword" 24 7 -offences which were held to be committed
against the crown, where the crown was the avenger together with or on
behalf of the injured party or his kin.2 48 The term folcriht begins to disappear after the Conquest, but it is replaced in Latin by the term consuetudo
Angliae (customs of England),24 9 or later, we have seen above, by the term
'common right' or 'ius commune' in Glanvill and Bracton.2 5 0 And while all
of the British cyneryhta were retained by the Conqueror, they were gradually transmuted into other names; nevertheless, as Maitland points out, the
principle that all temporal justice is the king's was making itself good as
against 'tribalism, communalism [and] feudalism.'2 5 1 Thus in Latin and
French, the common laws by which the king governed were referred to as
leges, consuetudines et libertates25 2 (laws, customs and liberties/franchises)
or les leyes et custumes et franchises2 53 (laws and customs and liberties/
franchises).
So far as the law and the economy, and the administration of justice
and government were concerned, the Conquest was, in fact, distinguished
by an extraordinary continuity from the preceding Anglo-Saxon reigns.
D.

The Continuity of the Law Continues.

Subsequent Anglo-Norman kings also took the English coronation
oath and promised to maintain the peace,2 54 and also reiterated a commitment to the maintenance of the old laws of their predecessors; the outstanding example of this was Henry I's Coronation Charter of 1100.255
William II, obtained the throne only on the basis of his coronation
oath; 25 6 while his successor in turn, Henry I, in effect purchased the crown
by seizing the Treasury and by swearing in his coronation oath and coronation charter to
246. Jura quae rex super omnes homines habet, and propriaplacita regis, some 40 in number. See
Leges Henrici Primi, 10 and 52 (quoted in JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 110).
247. JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 110 (referring to Placitagladii, pleas of the sword of the Norman
Duke).
248. PLUCKNE-1, supra note 92, at 427.
249. JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 177.

250. See, supra text accompanying notes 160-166 (discussing ius commune and common right).
251. MAITLAND & FOLLOCK, supra note 137, at 1:528-9.
252. . . .leges et consuetudines ab antiquis iustis et deo deuotis regibus . . . leges consuetudines et
libertates a glorioso rege edwardo (LIBER REGALIS 13-14th centuries); note also Henry II coronation
charter 1154 ("et libertates et liberas consuetudines quas rex Henricus I").
253. les leys et custumes et franchises [French version of Liber Regalis] from SIR MATTHEw HALE,
Prerogativa Regis, The Prerogatives of the King, 1640-1660, 66 (D. E. C. YALE, ed., Selden Society
1976).
254. E.g. STUBBS, supra note 234, at 1: §105, 321] (stating that William II, who promised to preserve justice and equity and mercy throughout the realm, would defend against all men the peace,
liberty, and security of the churches.)
255. Latin available in STuas, supra note 165, at 116 (translated in STEPHENSON & MARCHAM,
supra note 229, at 46-48).
256. STUans, supra note 234,at I: §105, 321
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...in the first place make the holy church of God free...
And I henceforth remove all the bad customs through which
the kingdom of England has been unjustly oppressed;.

.

.I

establish my firm peace throughout the whole kingdom and
command that it henceforth be maintained. I restore to you
the law of King Edward, together with those amendments
by which my father, with the counsel of his barons, amended
it. . .
This coronation charter, referred to sometimes as the Charter of Liberties, 258 was in many ways a precursor of Magna Carta:2 59 it is said that
Henry's Coronation Charter was rediscovered by Stephen Langton, who
persuaded the barons to require a similar charter from John.2 60
One significant feature of Henry I's coronation charter was that which
reflected his oath that the king was empowered to make the laws-but he
must abrogate bad laws and evil customs, and make and hold fast to good
laws.26 1 (This was but a logical extension of Alfred's culling of the laws
some centuries earlier). Henry and his successors up to Henry III all issued
a coronation charter, adopting or reinforcing the laws of his predecessor; or
at least, those of them which were seen to be good and just.2 6 2 Such a
coronation charter replaced the specificity of the laws of, for example, Alfred, Cnut or William I, which individually ensured the keeping of their
predecessors' laws.26 3 The practice also arose at this time, of "restoring" to
the people, by virtue of the coronation charter,2 64 the old and good laws of
the king's predecessor(s), thus ensuring the continuity of the law. 65
257. STEPHENSON & MARCHAM, supra note 229, at 46-48 (translated from the Latin text in
LIEBERMANN, DIE GESETZE, supra note 238, at I: 521 ff).
258. STUBBS, supra note 234, at 116-119.

259. Magna Carta's first provision, like that of Henry I's coronation charter, was that "the English
church shall be free. . ."
260. Blackstone related how the chronicler Matthew Paris attributed the movement towards the
charter as a result of the sudden discovery of Henry I's Coronation Charter of Liberties. SIR WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, THE GREAT CHARTER, vii (1759) (quoted in W. S. McKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA, A
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN, 48 (2d ed. 1914) (1905); RAY STRINGHAM,
MAGNA CARTA: FOUNTAINHEAD OF FREEDOM, 10, 119 (Aqueduct Books 1966) (saying it was Stephen
Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury, who discovered Henry's charter, and read it to the barons in

November 1214); See also PLUCKNETT, supra note 92, at 22-26.

261. See the reference in H. G. Richardson, The Coronation in Medieval England, in TRADITIO,
111 (1960), from LIEBERMANN, supra note 238, at I: 521 ("Deinde iurat quod leges malas et consuetudines peruersas . . . delebit et bonas custodiet.")

262. See the Coronation Charters of Henry I, Stephen, and Henry II in STans, supra note 165.
263. LAWS OF ALFRED, c. 49,

§ 9; Cnut

required adherence to the laws of Edgar. ANGLO-SAXON

CHRONICLE, 1018D ("Dene and Engle wurdon sammale at Oxanaforda to eadgares Lage" quoted in
JOLLIFFE, supra note 201, at 105; see also BLAIR, supra note 218, at 100-01; William I, 7, discussed supra
in text accompanying notes 238-242.
264. See FORESTER, supra note 235, at 207-08 (describing the coronation of Henry I, "legem regis
Eadwardi omnibus in commune reddidit, cum illis emendationibus quibus pater suus illam emendavit,
[he restored the laws of king Edward to all in common, with such amendments as his father had
made .. .]"; see also Latin quotation from FLOR. WIG. II 46 ff. in Hoyt, supra note 165, at 239.
265. This practice derived from William I's undertaking to apply the laws of his predecessor, Edward the Confessor; continued by Henry I, who also undertook to restore those laws of Edward which
had been abrogated by his immediate predecessor, William Rufus; and by Henry II, who undertook to
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Again in times of upheaval, Stephen took the crown, and maintained
his right by virtue of his coronation oath and anointing, as did Henry II,
and both of them confirming their oaths in a coronation charter specifically
reiterating the confirmation of the grants of liberties and customs to the
church and people issued by their predecessors, and confirming also the
laws of their predecessors,2 6 6 Henry I and Edward the Confessor. Henry II
appears to have added an additional promise to those rehearsed above in
that he promised to maintain the rights of the crown.26 7 Moreover, either
as an adjunct to this promise, or as an addition, he appears to have undertaken to restore the inheritances of those displaced in the civil war of Stephen's reign.26 8
It was in the reign of Henry II that the writer whom English lawyers
call Glanvill-Rannulf Glanvill who was Henry's Chief Justiciar 2 69 from
1180-wrote his Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Anglie be-

tween 1187 and 1189.270 Glanvill speaks of "the laws and customs of the
realm" [legibus, and later, iusta et regni consuetudinibus];he speaks of the

king as the author of peace; that the king and his judges exercise their
judgements with impartiality to all levels of society, and with equity, justice,
and truth; he says the king is guided by the laws and customs of the realm;
that the laws are those decided upon in council on the advice of the magnates [in concilio] and which have the king's agreement and his support.
These statements are in absolute accord with the statements of the AngloSaxon kings like Alfred, and later kings of England like Cnut, as well as
with the oaths of William I and Henry I. This is not any new development
of law, but rather an evolution of the common law which had been extant
for over 200 years, and completely in accord with Henry II's undertaking in

restore the laws of his predecessor Henry I. See, Carta Regis Henrici Secundi, Charter of Liberties, in
STUBBS, supra note 165, at 158, from STATUTES OF THE REALM, Charters of Liberties, 4 -probably
issued at Henry II's coronation: STUBs supra note 165, at 157.
266. See STuBsS, supra note 165, at 142, from STATUTES OF THE REALM, Charters of Liberties, 4.
Stephen's charter was witnessed by William Martel, and endorsed the charters and laws of Henry I and
Edward the Confessor. For Henry II, see STuBs, supra note 165, at 158 (Henry specifically endorsed
the charter granted by his predecessor, Henry I; his charter was witnessed by Ricardo de Luci.)
267. RICHARDSON, The Coronation in Medieval England, supra note 261, at 166 (after rehearsing
all the evidence, states: ". . . for it seems hardly open to doubt that Henry II gave an undertaking [to
safeguard the rights of the Crown] at his coronation"); see also Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Inalienability,29
SPECULUM 488-502 (1954); H. G. Richardson, The English Coronation Oath, 24 SPECULUM, 44, 47
(1949) (referring to Henry II's son's oath ("the young king Henry," who died in an insurrection against
his father and did not succeed) which included a promise to "maintain unimpaired the ancient customs
of the realm," which in part gave rise to the controversy with a'Becket, as the pope said that this oath
"imperilled the authority of the church."
268. BAKER, INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 144, at 231; And see the
Royal web-site, History of the Monarchy, The Angevins, Henry II Curtmantle, at http://www.royal.gov.
uk/output/Page62.asp.
269. The equivalent of a combination of the modem positions of Chief Justice and Prime Minister:
MAITLAND, supra note 140, at 13.
270. GLANVILL, supra note 120.
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his coronation charter to maintain the liberties promised in Henry I's Coronation Charter 27 1-this was a necessary period of consolidation after the
civil war between Stephen and Matilda.
Moreover, in all of these successions, the old common law of selection
and endorsement and binding of kings continued-A. L. Poole has stated:
of the six kings who followed the Conqueror, Richard I
alone succeeded in accordance with the strict rule of hereditary succession, and the title of four of them was challenged
by a rival. Until the chosen successor was crowned he was
merely dominus, the territorial lord and head of the feudal
state; after his coronation he became rex with all the attributes of regality.2 72
He notes that the Empress Matilda (who was never crowned or took
the oath) usually adopted the style Anglorum domina. Both Richard I and
John in the interval between their election and coronation use the title
dominus Angliae.27 3 Mere recognition by the people was not sufficient for
a person to be monarch (witness the case of Matilda, Lady of the English
who was acclaimed by the people, but never took the oath nor was ever
crowned). It was the taking of the oath which bound the monarch to the
people, and which enabled the making, reiteration, and continuation of the
law-indeed, the coronation charters fitted precisely the terms of the old
Anglo-Saxon oath.
From the time of Henry III onwards, there were no more issues of
coronation charters. Kings continued to take the coronation oath, but
there was no longer any need for a coronation charter, as its basic statement of principles, as for example outlined in Henry I's coronation charter,
were enshrined in the revised Magna Carta, which was reaffirmed by each
king at the beginning of his council meetings.27 4
Henry III venerated the Anglo-Saxon Saint Edward the Confessor; he
rebuilt Edward's Westminster Abbey;2 75 and in 1269; Henry had Edward's
body 'placed ceremonially in a new coffin which he shouldered himself
271. Henry II Charter of Liberties, in STuns, supra note 165, at 158; see also Richardson, supra
note 261, at 166.
272.

A. L. POOLE, FROM DooMSDAY BOOK TO MAGNA CARTA, 1087-1216, (3rd ed. 1993) (1951).

273. POOLE, supra note 272, at 3, n. 1.
274. E.g. the first parlement of Richard II, ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM, III, 5-7 [French] (reprinted in STEPHENSON & MARCHAM, supra note 229, at 232-34); I Henry 4, c. 1 (STATUTES AT LARGE,
393); 2 Henry 6, c. 1 (STATUTES AT LARGE, 466); see also the note in STATUTES AT LARGE which refers

to Co. LIrr. f. 81, and the list of confirmations of the Charter, which number thirty after the Confirmation of 25 Edward 1, up to the time of the fourth year of Henry V; all of these citations are cap. 1that is, the first statement or enactment of the meeting of that council or parlement.
275. Edward the Confessor had been responsible for enlarging the church on a grand scale, but he
was too ill to attend its consecration in December 1065, and he died a month later. Henry III, in
addition to rebuilding the Abbey, built within it a great shrine to Edward. See, THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE BRITISH MONARCHY, 650-651 (JoHN CANNON & RALPH GRIFFITHS eds., Ox-

ford Univ. Press 1992) (1988).
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when it was carried to its new exotic shrine in Westminster Abbey.' 27 6
Henry III named his eldest son Edward, a name theretofore unbestowed
The authors of The Oxupon the sons of the Anglo-Norman dynasties.
ford Illustrated History of the British Monarchy assert that Saint Edward
the Confessor's name was inserted in the coronation oath shortly after Edward's body had been interred in the shrine.27 8
Whether it was the doing of Henry III or not, the idea of the kings
"restoring" the old laws of their predecessors (in particular those of Edward the Confessor) and of upholding the good laws and putting down the
bad, was formalised in the liturgical records of the coronation oath from
that time thence in what became known as the Liber RegaliS2 7 9 in a new
first clause to the oath:
Will you grant and keep, and by your oath confirm, to the
people of England, the laws and customs to them granted by
the ancient kings of England your righteous and godly predecessors, and especially the laws, customs, and privileges
granted to the clergy and people by the glorious king [saint]
Edward, your predecessor? 280
This first proposition referring to "the laws. . ." of Edward the Confessor (who in fact actually made no laws at all) and their maintenance was
reproduced for centuries by clerics and ecclesiaticals in the Liber Regalis
and its offshoots, and was definitely included in the coronation oath sworn
by the Stuart kings in the seventeenth century.2 8 1 What this indicates is
that the monarchs and the people saw the laws as being grounded in the
Anglo-Saxon laws, and as having evolved over the centuries as Hale had
understood. It therefore appears that the law common to the people of
England was not merely judge-made law, but also laws made by the king
276. CANNON & GRIFFITHS, supra note 275, at 202.
277. MARC BLOCH, THE ROYAL TOUCH, SACRED MONARCHY AND SCROFULA IN ENGLAND AND
FRANCE, 94 (Routledge & Kegan Paul 1973) (translated from LES RoIS THAUMATURGES, 1961, Max

Leclerc et Cie).
278. CANNON & GRIFFITHS, supra note 275, at 202.
279. The Third Recension of the English Coronation order was compiled some time in the twelfth
century, (c.1100) and used to be referred to as the coronation order for Henry I. Various versions of a
more elaborate oath which refers to St Edward the Confessor are to be found from the thirteenth
century onwards, and these are usually referred to as the recensions of the Fourth English Coronation
Order, which reached its final version c. 1351-1377, which final version is known as the LIBER REGALIS
(Royal Book, King's Book, Book of the King's Office). For text see LEGG, ENGLISH CORONATION

RECORDS, supra note 91, at 81 (Latin Text); translation of Oath, at 117.
280. For text, see infra Part VII, Annex, C. See also STUBBS, supra note 234, at §249, (citing to
FOEDERA, CONVANTIONES, LITERAE ET CUJUSCUNQUE GENERIS ACTA PUBLICA, 32-36; PARL. WRITS.

II. ii. 10; STATUTES, i. 168); see also STEPHENSON & MARCHAM, supra note 229, at 192, from the
French, STATUTES OF THE REALM, I, 168; HALE, PREROGATIVA REGIS, supra note 253, at 66. (There is
also an Anglo-French version of the Liber Regalis oath dating from as early as 1272). See THREE CORONATION ORDERS, (J. WICKHAM LEGG, ed., 1900) (No. 40 from a manuscript, No. 20, belonging to
Corpus Christi College, Cambridge).
281. See infra Part VII, Annex, D; see also EDWARD, EARL OF CLARENDON, 2 HISTORY OF THE
REBELLION AND CIVIL WARS IN ENGLAND, V, 292 ff. (Clarendon Press 1958) (1888) (report by Claren-

don of Charles I's own words about his oath).
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and his advisers, prerogative and customs, again just as Hale had understood in the seventeenth century.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In essence then, what we have is a continuity of the laws from AngloSaxon times secured by the oath of governance. This oath gave power to
the monarchs, and simultaneously set limits on that power, while directing
how the power should be exercised. Each monarch undertook to govern
according to just laws and customs, to make judgements according to justice with mercy and equity, to maintain the peace, and to make good laws
and root out old bad ones. Up until the time of Henry III, the Norman/
English kings promised to maintain the good laws of their predecessors.
From the time of Henry III until the time of the revolution of 1688 (OS)
[1689 NS], monarchs specifically gave an undertaking to maintain the laws,
customs and liberties/privileges which had anciently been recognized as law
(particularly those of Edward the Confessor), to judge with law and mercy,
and to maintain the laws of God. While in 1689 the reference to the laws of
the Confessor was dropped, and redrafted to suit the Commons' Protestant
mentality, the oath retained the basic undertaking: the monarch must
* govern according to statutes, laws and customs.
* cause law and justice in mercy to be executed in all
judgements.
* maintain the laws of God
- and the Protestant Reformed Religion established by
law in England.2 8 2
It has remained basically unchanged since. Elizabeth II
swore to:
* govern all Her realms according to their respective laws
and customs.
* cause law and justice in mercy to be executed in all

judgements.
* maintain the laws of God
- and the settlement of the Church of England, and the
doctrine, worship, discipline, and government thereof as
by law established in England.2 8 3
Moreover, the modern oath still echoes fundamental principles as
enunciated in the Anglo-Saxon oath:28 4
* to preserve peace to the "Church of God" and all the
(Christian) people.
282. See infra Part VII, Annex E; see also, supra text accompanying notes 101-102.
283. See infra Part VII, Annex F; see also, supra text accompanying note 102.
284. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 97-111
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* to forbid rapine [reaf-lac robbery usually with violence,
plundering] and all injustice to all people of all
conditions.
* to do right [riht, right, equity, aequitem] and mildheartedness [mild-heortnisse/compassion/mercy] in all
judgements.2 8 5
Clearly, from Anglo-Saxon times, governance was and is concerned
with the maintenance of the peace, the eradication of injustice, the application of justice and right to all persons equally, and to ensure that right was
done with equity and mercy in all judgements. These principles found their
articulation in the oath of governance which sets out the parameters within
which governance occurs-it both confers and confines all aspects of lawmaking power necessary for good government and both embodies and bequeaths rule by law.2 8 6 This oath, it is argued, is the source of the law
common to the English and now the United Kingdom's and Australia's
people.
The common law, the law by which the people are governed in common, is not just judge-made law. It consists in fact of those laws made by
the monarch or Head of State and his or her advisers in the Houses of
Parliament (or earlier, with the three estates of lords spiritual and temporal
and the commons); the prerogative; certain customs; and decisions of
judges. All this common law must be directed towards the maintenance of
the peace and protection of the people, and must strive for the right, the
riht, the just. As Hale said, the common law is the "just, known, and common Rule of Justice and Right between Man and Man, within this

Kingdom." 28 7

Therefore it can be seen that any concentration upon the "common
law" as being "judge-made law," or the law as made by courts, is a misconception. While lawyers might wish to see the "common law" as the result
of their own (it must be admitted, very considerable) endeavours over the
years, constitutional history shows that this just cannot be the case-the
people, legislators and monarchs have played an even more significant role.
(Were it not for people and legislation, what would there be for judges to
judge upon? Were it not for the relationship between monarchs and the
people, where would be great constitutional achievements like Alfred's
domboc, the Magna Carta,the Declarationof Breda,28 8 the Bill of Rights,289
285. See text of the oath and translation, infra Part VII, Annex A-B.
286. See sample texts of oaths, infra Part VII, Annex; see also discussion and observations, supra
note 44, and text accompanying notes 4-14.
287. See supra text accompanying note 72.
288. Charles II, Declarationof Breda, 1660 (4/14 April, 1660, in the twelfth year of his reign);
Lords Journals, XI, 7-8 (here the king in the interests of the maintenance of the peace, pardoned all
offenders against the law during the Interregnum, except for those regicides still living, and required
that no previous such breach of the law should be held against any). See J. P. KENYON, THE STUART
CONSTrruTION, DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY, 357-358 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1965). The general

pardon received the imprimatur of parliament in the Act of Oblivion, 12 Car. 2, c. 11 (1660).
289. Bill of Rights 1 W. & M., §. 2, c. 2 (1689).
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the 1776 American Declaration of Independence, the extension of the
franchise in the nineteenth century, the establishment of the independent
Commonwealth of Australia 2 9 0 ?) While the profession might well see the
"common law" through the prism of its experience, this is not its essence.
While it may be convenient in lay terms to describe the English adversarial
system as "common" law, as opposed to the inquisitorial "civil" law, it is an
oversimplification then to assert that only judge-made law is the common
law. A historical analysis of the development of English law shows that
"common law" has gone hand in hand with the monarch's oath of governance. This oath, while conferring judicial power, confers other powers as
well. For any to think that the source of power can conveniently be overlooked, while aggrandizing one of the powers (that exercised by the judges)
necessary to maintain justice and right in the kingdom or the nation state to
being in the position of the only power capable of doing so, is in this
writer's view unconstitutional, ahistorical, injudicious, and dangerous.
The theory of "common law constitutionalism" as expounded by those
scholars and judges referred to earlier, 2 9 1 needs, in this writer's respectful
opinion, to look beyond the judiciary and take into account constitutional
history and the development of the democratic polity within the ambit of
the oath of governance. To do otherwise not only smacks of hubris and
arbitrariness, but is surely both unwise and injudicious. Moreover, legal
historians need to embrace constitutional history with open arms, rather
than allow it to become mistress to historians and political scientists. Constitutional history is not the same as legal history and it certainly is far from
antiquarian; rather it is of vital importance to present day democracy, governance, law, and jurisprudence. And certainly it demonstrates that it is not
the judicial bench that represents "an hieroglyphic of the laws."

290. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict. c. 12.
291. See supra text accompanying notes 15-55.
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SAMPLE TEXTS292

732-736:Pontificalof Echberht, Archbishop of York 2 93

Tria precepta or the Promissio Regis
Missa pro rege in die benedictionis294

Ad Populum.
Omnipotens sempiterne deus nostri regni defende regem atque rectores. ut in tua dextra confidentes. fiant hostibus
suis fortiores uniuersis. per dominum

295

Primum mandatum regis ad populum hic uidere potes.2 96
Rectitudo regis est noutier ordinati et in solium sublimati.
haec tria precepta populo christiano sibi subdito precipere.
in primis ut aeclesia dei et omnis populus christianus ueram
pacem seruent in omni tempore. Amen
Alia.2 97
Aliud est ut rapacitates et omnes iniquitates.
gradibus interdicat. Amen.

omnibus

292. Oaths were always taken in the vernacular (i.e. English). See for a comprehensive discussion
of the oaths of the English monarchs, MRLL KELLY, KING AND CROWN, supra note 3. For the vernacular,see also H. G. Richardson, The English coronationOath, 24 SPECULUM 46 (1949) and Richardson,
The Coronation in Medieval England, supra note 261, at 171. The Latin versions are those in the coronation ordines prepared usually by ecclesiastics. The oath itself was written on a piece of paper, in the
language of the time, and usually kept by the Archbishop of Canterbury: but being ephemeral, many of
the originals have been lost-see Richardson, Coronation in Medieval England, supra note 261.
293. The authoritative text is in Two ANGLO-SAXON PONTIFICALS, 1 ff., 110-113 (H. M. J. Banting, ed. Boydell Press 1989) (from MS Lat. 10575 in the Bibliotheque Nationale). Latin texts of the
English coronation oath dating from possibly as early as the 8th century exist in the Leofric Ordo
(Bodleian MS 579) and the Pontifical of Echberht/Egbert, Archbishop of York (732-766), and certainly
are extant in the 10th century. See Pontifical of Echberht, BANTING, id.; see also the Pontifical also in L.
G. W. LEGG, supra note 91, at 9; Coronation ordine for fEthelred II (king, 978-1016) in ARTHUR
TAYLOR, THE GLORY OF REGALITY: AN HISTORICAL TREATISE OF THE ANOINTING AND CROWNING
OF THE KINGS AND QUEENS OF ENGLAND, (R. & A. Taylor, 1820) (Appendix to Book IV, No. 2, from

MS. Cotton Claud. A iii, 395); this ordo also at LEGG, supra note 91, at 15.
294. LEGo, supra note 91, at 3.
295. LEGG, supra note 91, at 8-9.
296. LEGG, supra note 91, at 9, n. 1 (noting that the Echberht pontifical includes these words as a
heading).
297. This is inserted at this point in The Egbert Pontifical, as published in BANTING, supra note

293, at 113.
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Tertium est ut in omnibus iudiciis. aequitem et misericordiam precipiat. . ut [per hoc2 98] sibi et nobis indulgeat
misericordiam suam clemens et misericors deus. Amen.29 9
The Mass for Kings on the Day of their Hallowing300
Over the people.
Almighty and everlasting God, defend our king and the rulers of our land, that trusting in thy right hand, they may be
stronger than all their enemies, through our Lord Jesus
Christ. Amen.30 1
This is the first decree of a king to his people.
It is the duty of a king newly ordained and enthroned to
enjoin on the Christian people subject to him these three
precepts:
First, that the Church of God and all the Christian people
preserve true peace at all times. Amen.
Secondly, that he forbid rapacity and all iniquities to all degrees. Amen.
Thirdly, that in all judgements he enjoin equity and mercy,
that therefore the clement and merciful God may grant us
his mercy. Amen.3 02

298.

BANTING,

supra note 293, (per hoc appears here in the Bradshaw manuscript instead of sibi

et.)
299. LEGG, supra note 91, at 9 (noting in n. 1 that the Echberht pontifical has the word "Amen"
after each of the three clauses).
300. Id. at 9 (English translation).
301. Id. at 13 (English translation).
302. Id. at 13.
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7th-13th century Anglo-Saxon oath
This oath, uttered in the vernacular (Anglo-Saxon) was taken by

/Ethelstan,30 3 Edgar,30 4 )Ethelred,os Cnut,30 6Edward the Confessor,3 07
Harold 11,308 and William I,309 William I1,310 Henry 1,311 and Stephen. 3 1 2
-Dis ge-writ is ge-writen staf be stefe be bam ge-write, fe
Dunstan arceb. sealde urum hlaforde eat Cingestune, fa on
dceg ba hine man halgode to cinge, 7 for-bead him ceic wedd
to syllane, butan bysan wedde, ke he up on Cristes weofod
lide, swa se b. him dihte:
On bere halgan b rinnesse naman, Ic breo king be-hite
cristenum folce, 7 me under-aeoddem:

303. See D. H. TURNER, THE CLAUDIUS PONTIFICALS, xxxiii; as referred to in the Introduction to
the Egbert Pontifical, as printed in BANTING, supra note 293, at 925.
304. Edgar, king, 959-975, oath taken 973, see 1 LIEBERMANN, supra note 238, at 217; see also
TAYLOR, supra note 293, (Appendix to Book IV, No. 3, from MS. Cott. Cleop. B xiii, 56, at 405-406).
For another text, see also THE RUTLAND PAPERS, ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE
COURTS AND TIMES OF HENRY VII AND HENRY VIII, selected from the private archives of His Grace the
Duke of Rutland, &c. &c. &c., (William Jerdan ed., Camden Society 1842); New York: AMS Press
reprint with the permission of the Royal Historical Society, 1968), Preface

xi., which he ascribes to

Edgar (king, 959-975). Janet L. Nelson, (see reference, supra note 167, at 29-48) (making a strong case
for existence of the English coronation rite from at least the early 9th century, and very possibly
earlier).
305. LEGG, supra note 293, at 23 (taken from manuscript at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge;
[Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, MS. 146. p. 138]); see also J. WICKHAM LEGG, supra note 280,
at 53 ( text of oath at 53, notes at xxxviii-xliii). He gives the texts of all variations of the second
recension of the English coronation order and their location at xxxix. See also 1 STUBBS, supra note
234, at 164, n. 3, (citing to KEMBLE, SAXONs, ii. 36, who in turn sources it to RELIOUE ANTIQUAE, ii.
194, to MASKELL, MONUMENTA RITUALIA, iii. 5, and to MEMORIALS OF S. DUNSTAN, at 355).
306. See M. K. LAWSON, CNUT, THE DANES IN ENGLAND IN THE EARLY ELEVENTH CENTURY,
129 (Longman Group 1993) (citing to ENCOMIUM EMMAE REGINAE, xlvii-xlviii (A. Campbell, ed.,
Camden Society, Third Series, lxxii, London, 1949)).
307. See ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KINGS Two BODIES, A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THOUGHT, 346-347 (Princeton Univ. Press, 1997) (1957) (reprinted version with an introduction by
William Chester Jordan); see also 1 LIEBERMANN, supra note 238, at 635, 11, 1A, 2, and 640, 13, 1A.
308. 1 FLORENTI WIGORNIENSIS MONACHI CHRONICON EX CHRONICIs, 224 (quoted in Hoyt, supra
note 165, at 239).
309. DARLINGTON & McGURK, supra note 111, at entry for 1066; cf. THE ANGLO-SAXON CHRONICLE, D, at entry for 1066; see THE ANGLO-SAXON CHRONICLES, (Michael Swanton, ed. Phoenix Press
2000). John of Worcester is followed by SIMEON OF DURHAM, 2 HISTORIA REGUM IN SYMEONIS
MONACHI OPERA OMNIA

182 (T.

ARNOLD

ed., Rolls Series 1882), who is in turn followed by HOWDEN,

1 CHRONICA MAGISTRI ROGERI DE HOUEDENE 116 (W. STUBBS, ed., Rolls Series 1871); see also Hoyt,
supra note 165, at 239; MAITLAND, supra note 140, at 98-99; 1 STUEBS, supra note 234, at §95; H. G.

Richardson & G. 0. Sayles, Early Coronation Records, 13 BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF HIST. RE129, 137 (1936) (1936); see also DAVID C. DOUGLAS, WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR, 248 (Univ. of
California Press 1964).
310. 1 STUBBS, supra note 234, at §105; MAITLAND, supra note 140, at 99.
311. LEGG, supra note 91, at 30; see also 2 ENG. HIST. DOCUMENTS 176; Hoyt, supra note 165, at
242, n. 28 (referring to Annales monasteriide Waverleia, in 2 ANNALES MONASTICI 208 (H. R. LUARD,
ed., 1869).
312. GESTA STEPHANI, 6-7, 10-11 (K. R. Potter & R. H. C. Davis eds., OMT, 1976); see also
SEARCH

MARJORIE CHIBNALL, THE EMPRESS MATILDA: QUEEN CONSORT, QUEEN MOTHER AND LADY OF THE

75-77 (Blackwell Publishers, 1999) (1991) (citing GILBERT FOLIAT, LETTERS AND CHARTERS
60-66 (Adrian Morey and C. N. L. Brooke eds. Cambridge, 1967); JOHN OF
SALISBURY, HISTORIA PONTIFICALiS, 83-86 (M. Chibnall ed., OMT, 1986).
ENGLISH,

OF GUILBERT FOLIAT,
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{This writing is written letter by letter after the writing
which Dunstan the archbishop delivered to our lord at
Kingston on the day on which they consecrated him as king,
and he forbad him to give any pledge {promise/covenant}except this pledge {promise/covenant}which he laid
on Christ's altar, as the bishop {directed him}.
In the name of the holy Trinity, I promise three things to
Christian people, and bind myself to them:313}
dn cerest, P Godes cyrice 7 eall cristen folc minra ge-wealda
soae sibbe healde;
oaer is P reaf-lac 7 ealle unrihte king eallum hddum forbeode;
kridde, P ic be-hdte 7 be-beode on eallum d6mum riht 7
mild-heortnisse,kcet us eallum arfwest 7 mild-heort God furh
P his ecean miltse for-gife, so lifaD 7 rixa. 3 14

{First, that the Church of God and all the Christian people
preserve true peace at all times.
The next is that I will forbid rapine [reaf-lac,robbery usually
with violence, plundering] and all injustice [unrihte bing,
unjust/unright things] to people of all conditions [all manner
of persons irrespective of rank];
The third, that I vow and promise in all [my] judgments justice [riht, right, equity, aequitem] and mild-heartedness
[mild-heortnisselcompassion/mercy],that the gracious God

through his everlasting mercy may forgive us all, who shall
live and reign"'
[Old English version said to be for Edgar [959-975]; Latin
version said to be c. 8 t" century and certainly extant in the
9th.]

B.

11-12th Century Additions to the Oath (England)

Edward the Confessor appears to have added an additional promise to
those rehearsed in the oath above-this was 'to restore all the rights, dignities, and lands which his predecessors "have alienated from the Crown of
the realm," and to recognise it as his duty "to observe and defend all the
313. Translation in brackets mine.
314. See LIEBERMANN et al., Supra note 304.
315. Translation from LEGG, supra note 91 (translation in brackets mine from the Old English
text).
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dignities, rights, and liberties of the Crown of this realm in their wholeness.
'maintain the rights of the crown."' 3 1 6
1154 Henry II: Charter of Liberties-made at time of coronation;
scholars suggest that Henry's oath, while undertaking to confirm and restore the laws of Henry I, also contained an undertaking to safeguard the
rights of the crown."'
Carta Regis Henrici Secundi318
HENRICUS Dei gratia Rex Angliae, dux Normanniae et
Aquitanniae, et comes Andegaviae, omnibus comitibus,
baronibus et fidelibus suis Franciset Anglicis salutem Sciatis
me ad honorem Dei et sanctae ecclesiae et pro communi
emendatione totius regni mei, concessisse et reddidisse et
praesenti carta mea confirmasse Deo et sanctae ecclesiae et
omnibus comitibus et baronibus et omnibus hominibu meis
omnes concessiones et donationes et libertates et liberas consuetudines quas rex Henricus avus meus eis dedit et consessit.
Similiter etiam omnes malas consuetudines quas ipse delevit
et remisit, ego remitto et deleri concedo pro me et haeredibus
meis. Quare volo et firmiterpraecipioquod sancta ecclesia et
omnes comites et barones et omnes mei homines, omnes illas
consuetudines et donationes et libertates et liberas consuetudines habeant et teneant, libere et quiete, bene et in pace et
integre, de me et haeredibus meis, sibi et haeredibus suis,
adeo libere et quiete et plenarie in omnibus sicut Rex Henricus avus meus eis dedit et concessit et carta sua confirmavit
Teste Ricardo de Luci apud Westmonasterium.
C. Liber Regalis 14th-16th century (England)
1351-1377319 Liber Regalis32 0 : (The Royal Book, or The Book of the
Royal Office) -'Fourth' English Coronation Order. This oath appears to
have been taken by Edward I, Edward II, Edward III, Richard II, Henry
IV. Latin text and translation from Leopold G. Wickham Legg, English
Coronation Records, (Westminster: Archibald Constable & Company Limited, 1901), 87 (Latin Text); translation of oath,117; Legg uses a manuscript
held by the Dean of Westminster, dated at about the time of Richard II.
French text from Sir Matthew Hale, The Prerogatives of the King, 16401660, D. E. C .Yale, ed., (London: Selden Society, 1976), at 66, sourced to
[rot. claus.] 1 E. 2, m. 10 dorso, and to Cal. C. R. (1307-1313), and
Foedera,iii, 63. For an almost identical French text, see Robert S. Hoyt, in
316. KANTOROWIcz, KING's Two BODIES, supra note 307, at 346-7 (referring to 1 LIEBERMANN,
supra note 238, at 11,1A,2, 13,1A and to "Richardson," in BULLETIN OP THE INSTITUTE OF HISTORICAL
RESEARCH, xvi,7, 10(1938); TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SocIarY at xxiii, 149 f (4th ser. 1941).
317. Richardson, supra note 261, at 166; see also KANTOROWICZ, supra note 307, at 167.
318. STUBBS, supra note 165, at 158.
319. This is the date ascribed to it by Richardson, supra note 261, at 112, 149.
320. LEGO, supra note 91, at 81 ff (Latin Text, translation at 112 ff).
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'The Coronation Oath of 1308: the background of "Les Leys et les Custumes",' Traditio, Vol. XI, 1955,. 235-257, 237, sourced apparently to The
ParliamentaryWrits and Writs of Military Summons, (ed. Francis Palgrave,
n.p. 1827-34) II, 2 Appendix, 10.
Hic est ordo secundum quem Rex debet coronaripariter et

inungi.321
This is the order according to which a king must be crowned
and anointed.

Memoratus uero princeps nocte precedente coronacionissue
diem uacabit contemplatacionidiuine et oracioniintime considerans ad quem apicem sit uocatus. qualiter is per quem
reges regnant ad populi sui ac plebis christiane gubernavionem ipsum specialius preelegit. Et cogitet illud sapientis.
Prinsipem te constituerunt noli sed esto in illis quasi unus ex
illis. Et cogitaet dignitatum regalem sibi a deo prestitam tanquam homini mortali et ipsum iccirco ad tantam sublimitatem uocatum a deo ut ecclesie catholice sit defensor. fidei
christiane dilator. ac regni sui et patrie sibi a deo commisse
secundum uires protector....
Now the said prince on the night before the day of his coronation shall give himself up to heavenly contemplation and
to prayer, meditating to what a high place he has been
called, and how he through whom kings reign has appointed
him in especial to govern his people and the Christian folk.
And let him ponder on these words of the wise man: If thou
be made the master, lift no thyself up, but be among them as
one of the rest. [Ecclesiastes. xxxii. I.] And let him meditate that the royal dignity has been given him by God as to a
mortal man, and consider that he has been called to so high
a position by God to be a defender of the Catholic Church,
an extender of the Christian faith, and to protect, so far as
he can, his realm and country which God has given into his
charge....

Et si dictus abbas de medio fuerit sublatus. at alius in abbatem eiusdem loci nondum fuerit confirmatus qui dictum
offium rite non poterit adimplere: aut dictus abbas aliunde
321. LEGO, supra note 91, at 81.
322. LEGG, supra note 91, at 82.
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fuerit impeditus quominus illud officium ualeat exequi : tunc
eligaturunus ex assensu prioris et conuentus dicti monasterii
qui per omnia sit ydoneus dictum principem in huiusmodi
obseruanciis informare secundum modum et consuetudinem
ab antiquissimis temporibus hactenus usitatum. Hiis sub
uniuersorum concordia peractis....

On the day appointed on which the new king is to be consecrated, early in the morning the prelates and nobles of the
realm shall assemble in the royal palace of Westminster to
consider about the consecration and election of the new
king, and also about confirming and surely establishing the
laws and customs of the realm.
When this has been done with the agreement of all . . . [details about

the king's seat]

Finito quidem sermone ad plebem metropolitanus uel episcopus eundem mediocri distinctaque uoce interroget.3 24

The sermon [to the people] ended, the Metropolitan or
Bishop shall ask the king in a moderate and distinct voice:
Si leges et consuetudines ab antiquis iustis et deo deuotis
regibus plebi anglorum concessas cum sacramenti confirmacione eidem plebi concedere et seruareuoluerit. et presertium
leges consuetudines et libertates a glorioso rege edwardo
clero populoque concessas.325

Sieur, voilez vous graunter et garder et per votre serement
confirmer au people d'Angleterre les leyes et les custumes a
eux graunteesper les ancients royes d'Angleterre vos predecessors droitures et devotes a Dieu et nomement les leys et
custumes et franchises graunts au clergy et au people par le
glorieus roy [seint] Edward votre predecessor ?326
Will you grant and keep, and by your oath Confirm, to the
people of England, the Laws and Customs to them granted,
by the Kings of England your lawfull and religious predecessors; and namely the Laws Customs and franchises
granted to the Cleargy and to the people by the glorious
King St. Edward your predecessor?
323. LEGG, supra note 91, at 83.
324. LEGG, supra note 91, at87.
325.

LEGG, supra note 91.

326. The French text from HALE, supra note 253, at 66,
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Dicto autem principe se promittente omnia premissa concessurum et seruaturum.
Respons. Jeo les graunt et promett.

I grant and promise to keep them.
Tunc exponat ei metropolitanusde quibus iurabitita dicendo.

And when the king says that he will grant and keep all these
things the metropolitan shall set forth to him what he shall
swear, saying:
Seruabis ecclesie dei cleroque et populo pacem ex integro et
concordiam in deo secundurn uires tuas. 3 2 7

Respondabit. Seruabo.
Sieur, garderez vous a Dieu et a Sainct Eglise et au clergy,
et au people paix et accord au dieu entyrement selonc votre
poer ?
Respons. Jeo les garderai.
Will you keep peace and godly agreement, entirely according to your power, both to God, the holy Church, your [the]
Cleargy and your [the] People?
Response. I will keep it.
Faciesfieri in omnibus iudisiis tuis equam et rectam iusticiam
et discrecionem in misericordia et ueritate secundum uires
tuas.
Respondabit. Faciam.
Sieurferrez vous faire en toutes vos judgements, ovele et droit
justice et discretion in misericord et verite a votre poer ?
Respons. Jeo le ferrai

Will you to your power cause Lawe Justice and Discretion,
in Mercy and truth, to be executed in all your Judgements?
Response. I will.
327.

LEGG,

supra note 91, at 88.
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Concedis iustas leges et consuetudines esse tenendas. et
promittis eas per te esse protegendas. et ad honorem dei
roborandasquas uulgus elegerit secundum uires tuas.
Respondabit. Concedo et promitto.
Sieur, grant wus a tener et garder les leyes et les custumes
droitures, lesquelles le communaute de votre royalme aura esleu, et les defender et afforceres alhonor de Dieu a votre
poer?
Respons. Jeo le grant et promett.
Will you grant to hold and keep, the Laws and rightful Customs, which the Commonalty of this your Kingdom have:
and will you defend, and uphold them to the honour of
God, so much as in you lieth?
I grant and promise so to do.
Sequitur admonitio episcorum ad Regem, et legatur: ab uno
episcopo coram omnibus, clara voce dicendo.
Domine rex a uobis perdonaripetimus ut unicuique de nobis
et ecclesiis nobis commis canonicum priuilegium as debitam
legem atque iusticiam conseruetis. et defensionem exhibeatis:
sicut rex in suo regno debet unicuique episcopo. abbatibuset
ecclesiis sibi commis.
Then shall follow the admonition of the Bishops to the king,
to be read by one of the Bishops before all in a loud voice
saying:
Our Lord and King : We beseech you to pardon and to
grant, and to preserve unto us and your [the] Churches committed to our Charge, all Canonical privileges, and due Law
and Justice ; And that you would protect and defend us, as
every good King in his Kingdom, ought to be Protector, and
Defendor of the Bishops, and the Churches under their
government.
Respondabit. Animo libenti et deuoto promitto uobis et
perdono quai unicuique de uobis. et ecclesiis uobis commissis canonicum priuiegium et debitam legem atque iusticiam
seruabo. et defensionem quantum potuero adiuuante domio
exhibebo sicut rex in suo regno unicuique episcopo abbatibus
et ecclesiis sibi commissis per rectum exhibere debet.
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He shall answer:
With a willing and devout heart, I grant My Pardon; and
promise that I will preserve, and maintain to you, and the
Churches committed to your Charge, all Canonical Privileges, and due Law, and Justice ; and that I will be your
protector and defendor to my power, by the assistance of
God, as every good King in his Kingdom, in right ought to
protect and defend the Bishops and Churches under their
government.
Adiciatur predictis interrogacionibus que iusta fuerint
prenunciatis omnibus supradictis : dictus princeps confirmet
se omnia predicta esse seruaturum : sacremento super altare
coram cunctis protinus prestito.

Then shall be added to the aforesaid questions what is just;
when all the above have been put, then the prince shall confirm them by swearing upon the altar in sight of all that he
shall keep all the above.32 8
Finito uero ympno sequatur hec oracio.
This done, the Metropolitan or Bishop shall kneel devoutly,
and in a loud voice begin the hymnFalse
D.

1603-1685 Stuart Oath (England)-James VI and I

JURAMENTUM REGIS JACOBI,

1603329

Archbishop. Sir, will you grant and keep and by your oath
confirm to your people of England the laws and customs to
them granted by the kings of England your lawful and religious predecessors; and namely the laws, customs and
franchises granted to the clergy and to the people by the
glorious king, St Edward, your predecessor, according and
conformable to the laws of God and true profession of the
gospel established in this kingdom, and agreeing to the prerogatives of the kings thereof and to the ancient customs of
this realm?
King. I grant and promise to keep them.
328. LEOG, supra note 91, at 117.
329, This text is taken from the Tanner manuscript, in the Bodleian Library (Tanner MSS. (Bodl.),
vol. 94, f. 121, as reproduced at 391 in SELECT STATUTES AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL DocuMENTS
ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE REIGNS OF ELIZABETH AND JAMES I, (G. W. Prothero, ed., Oxford Clarendon

Press 1963) (1894); This oath was also taken by Charles I, Charles II and James II and VII; this last king
however omitted the following two italicised words from the fourth clause-"Sir, will you grant to hold
and keep the Laws and rightful customs which the commonalty of this your Kingdom have,. . ."
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A. Will you keep peace and agreement entirely, according
to your power, both to God, the holy church, the clergy and
the people?
K. I will keep it.

A. Will you to your power cause law, justice and discretion
in mercy and truth to be executed in all your judgments?
K. I will.

A. Sir, will you grant to hold and keep the laws and rightful
customs which the commonalty of your kingdom have, and
to defend and uphold them to the honour of God, so much
as in you lieth?
K. I grant and promise so to do.
Sequitur adminitio episcoporum, &c.

Our lord and king, we beseech you to grant and preserve
unto us and every one of us and the churches committed to
our charge all canonical privileges and due law and justice,
and that you would protect and defend us as every good
king in his kingdom ought to be a protector and defender of
the bishops and churches under their government.
K. With a willing and devout heartI promise and grant that I
will preserve and maintain to you and every of you and the
churches committed to your charge all canonical privileges
and due law and justice, and that I will be your protectorand
defender to my power by the assistance of God, as every
good king in his kingdom ought to protect and defend the
bishops and churches under their government.
E.

1689 William III and Mary I English Oath

Will You solemnely Promise and Sweare to Governe the
People of the Kingdome of England and the Dominions
thereto belonging according to the Statutes in Parlyament
Agreed on and the Laws and Customs of the same? 330
I solemnly Promise soe to doe.
Will You to Your power cause Law and Justice in Mercy to
be Executed in all Your Judgements.
I will.
330. Coronation Oath Act, 1 W. & M. c. 6, 1688 (1689 NS) (Eng.).
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Will You to the utmost of Your power maintaine the Laws
of God the true Profession of the Gospell and the Protestant Reformed Religion established by Law? And will you
preserve unto the Bishops and Clergy of this Realme and to
the Churches there committed to their Charge all such
Rights and Priviledges as by Law doe or shall appertaine
unto them or any of them.
All this I Promise to doe.
After this the King and Queene laying His and Her Hand
upon the Holy Gospells, shall say,
The things which I have here before promised I will
performe and Keepe
Soe help me God.
F. 1953 Elizabeth II Oath (All Realms)

The Queen having returned to her Chair (her Majesty having already on Tuesday, the fourth day of November, 1952,
in the presence of the two Houses of Parliament, made and
signed the Declaration prescribed by Act of Parliament),
the Archbishop standing before her shall administer the
Coronation Oath, first asking the Queen,3 3 1
Madam, is your Majesty willing to take the Oath?
And the Queen answering
I am willing.

The Archbishop shall minister these questions; and the
Queen, having a book in her hands, shall answer each question severally as follows:
Archbishop. Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the Peoples of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and
the Union of South Africa, Pakistan and Ceylon, and of
your Possessions and the other Territories to any of them
belonging or pertaining, according to their respective laws
and customs?
Queen. I solemnly promise so to do.
331.
ONATION,

JoHN ARLOTr ET AL., ELIZABETH CROWNED QUEEN, THE PICTORIAL RECORD OF THE COR-

53-54 (Odhams Press Limited, 1953).
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Archbishop. Will you to your power cause Law and Justice,
in Mercy, to be executed in all your judgements?
Queen. I will.
Archbishop. Will you to the utmost of your power maintain
the Laws of God and the true profession of the Gospel?
Will you to the utmost of your power maintain in the United
Kingdom the Protestant Reformed Religion established by
law? Will you maintain and preserve inviolably the settlement of the Church of England, and the doctrine, worship,
discipline, and government thereof, as by law established in
England? And will You preserve unto the Bishops and
Clergy of England, and to the Churches there committed to
their charge, all such rights and privileges, as by law do or
shall appertain to them, or any of them?
Queen. All this I promise to do.
Then the Queen arising out of her Chair, supported as
before, the Sword of State being carried before her, shall go
to the Altar, and make her solemn Oath in the sight of all
the people to observe the premisses: laying her right hand
upon the Holy Gospel in the Great Bible, (which was before
carried in the procession, and is now brought from the Altar
by the Archbishop, and tendered to her as she kneels upon
the steps), saying these words
The things which I have here before promised,I will perform,
and keep.
So help me God.
Then the Queen shall kiss the Book, and sign the Oath.'
[Then follows the presentation of the Bible, the communion
service, the epistle, the gospel, then the anointing]

